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A Case Study in the Banning of Political Parties:
The Pan-Arab Movement El Ard and the Israeli Supreme Court
Abstract
Attempts to outlaw political groups that are alleged to approve the use of violence, to limit
the expression of views that challenge the core values of democratic nation-states, and to
ban radical, separatist, or religious political parties are more widespread in recent years than
at any other time since 1945. They gave rise in the last few years to litigation in
Constitutional Courts and Supreme Courts in Spain, Germany, Turkey, France, Israel, and
Latvia, as well as in the European courts.
The present article tells the story of the encounter in the years 1959-1965 between the PanArab national movement El Ard (“The Land”) and the Israeli executive and judicial
branches. The movement’s affairs were litigated in the Israeli Supreme Court six times in
less then five years. Taken together, the six decisions raise important questions of civil
rights, judicial review, jurisprudence, and legal theory.
The article uses the case of El Ard in a manner that can be of interest to scholars of
comparative constitutional law: it elaborates on the question of how to interpret the
objectives of a party; it grapples with the question of what constitutes support for terror and
for the use of violence; it raises issues related to the nature of separatism, irredenta, and
pan-nationalism; it problematizes the test for adherence to democratic principles; and it
deals with the effects of emergency and post-war situations. The case study places in thick
context, with ample nuances, the dilemmas and doubts involved in the ban of political
parties, which have recently came to preoccupy many of Europe’s governments and courts.
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Foreword
In the US, the right to be elected is generally viewed as an individual right.

Historically it was challenged mainly with respect to individual Members of Congress or
individual candidates. Two tracks were used for this: expelling serving Members of
Congress based on Article I § 5 of the US Constitution with the concurrence of two thirds in
the relevant House; and disqualifying candidates who did not meet requirements added by
federal or state legislation to the existing requirements of age, citizenship, and residence
contained in Article I § 2 of the Constitution. Both tracks were used primarily in order to
expel or exclude individuals for reasons of corruption, criminal acts, election fraud, and the
like. Only in a handful of cases, notably with respect to supporters of the Confederation
during and after the Civil War, but also with respect to one Mormon, one Communist, and
one radical black activist, did the political views of the person motivate the majority in
Congress. Most recently, the constitutionality of the exclusion of candidates was litigated
with respect to term limits set in legislation for long serving candidates. This is a more
general category of excluded candidates, yet, the attempted exclusion in these cases, as in
most previous ones, is not based on the political views of the candidates.
In Europe and in some other democracies the right to be elected is denied usually at
the level of the political party and it is based on the party’s views and objectives. It became
clear in recent years that efforts to ban political parties are not taking place only in nondemocratic states and are not a matter of the past in many democracies. The banning of
parties is exercised frequently, litigated in the highest national and European courts, and
intensely debated in the academia and the media. The current phase of the debate originates
in the aftermath of World War II. In both Germany and Italy Constitutional provisions were
established to exclude Nazi and Fascist parties from participating in the elections. The
German provision, article 21.2 of the German Basic Law, was drafted with wider
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applicability, allowing the banning of political parties aiming to impair or destroy the free
democratic order. Based on this law, both a National Socialist party (SRP) and the
Communist Party (KPD) were banned in 1951. Article 21.2 was used again in the early
2000s to ban a radical right wing party (NPD). The ban was not confirmed by the German
Constitutional Court and is likely to occupy that court and the legal academia again in the
near future. The outlawing and banning of Neo-nazi and Neo-fascist parties was considered
and exercised elsewhere in Europe. Exclusion of candidates associated with former regimes
was carried out in the former Yugoslav states and is likely to be an issue in Iraq.
Recently banning on the grounds of separatism made headlines. In 2003 in Spain the
right to be elected was denied to Batasuna, the Basque separatist party. The ban was based
on Batasuna’s support for ETA and its use of violence. Spain’s Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court approved the ban. It was the first Spanish political party to be banned
since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. In May 2004 Spain's Supreme Court upheld a
ban on the Basque nationalist party Herritarren Zerrenda from participating in European
elections. The court said in its ruling that ETA and its banned political party Batasuna were
organizing political, social, and financial support for the Herritarren Zerrenda party. The
Spanish Constitutional Court reaffirmed the ban shortly before the June elections. As it
involves elections to the European Parliament, this move is likely to be litigated and debated
on the level of the European Union as well. In Turkey two separatist Kurdish parties were
prevented from taking part in political life on the grounds that they supported Kurdish selfdetermination and were affiliated with the terrorist group PKK. These bans have reached the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and are a factor in the ongoing negotiations
between Turkey and the EU.
The right to be elected of non-separatist national minority candidates became an
issue in Eastern Europe, which has a complex and substantial structure of often non-
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territorial minorities. A non-Latvian speaking candidate, member of a party whose aim is to
advance the interests of the Russian-speaking minority, was removed from the list because
she allegedly did not meet the Latvian language qualification requirement in the law. This
case reached the ECHR that held Latvia in violation of the European Convention. A
religious based ban arrived at the ECHR from Turkey. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
was banned, while still in opposition, by Turkey’s Constitutional Court in 1998 for activities
against the principle of secularism that were manifested in the party’s objectives, such as the
institution of Sharia law and a theocratic regime. This case also reached the ECHR, which
refused to rule against Turkey. Somewhat similar cases may emerge when groups within
Muslim minorities in Europe will seek to form religious political parties.
The present article tells the story of the encounter, in the years 1959-1965, between
the Pan-Arab national movement El Ard (“The Land”) and the executive and judicial
branches in Israel. The executive branch argued that the movement’s objectives threatened
the existence of the State of Israel and its territorial integrity. It took a variety of measure to
limit the movement’s political activity. These included shutting down its newspaper,
declaring it an illegal association, refusing to register the movement’s corporation, and
finally disqualifying the movement’s list of candidates for the 1965 general elections. These
effectively banned the movement from participating in Israel’s political process. Disputes of
the El Ard movement reached the Israeli Supreme Court six times between the years 19601965. Two of the decisions involving El Ard, the Kardosh1 and Yeredor2 cases, have become
part of the main canon of Israeli case law.3 These decisions are cited and studied in every
discussion dealing with freedom of association and the right to be elected in Israel. Taken
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High Court of Justice 60/241 Mansur Tewfik Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies, P.D. 15(2) 1151
(henceforth Kardosh case).
2
Elections App. 65/1 Yaakov Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Election Commission for the Sixth
Knesset, P.D. 19(3) 365 (henceforth Yeredor case).
3
This was reflected in their inclusion among the 50 cases that were exhibited in The court of law: fifty
years of adjudication in Israel (David Heshin et al. eds., 1999), pp. 61, 62, 64, 66-67, 84-86, 93, 153.
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together, the six decisions raise important questions of civil rights, judicial review,
jurisprudence, and legal theory. They deal with the status of unwritten principles and natural
law in the constitutional order of a system without a written constitution. Few movements
and organizations, if any, have had such far-reaching impact on the shaping of Israeli
constitutional law. This remarkable accomplishment was achieved by a small Arab national
political movement, without financial resources.
The case of El Ard can serve well scholars interested in comparative constitutional
law. It features many of the elements that resurfaced in recent years with respect to the
banning of political parties in other countries. It involves questions about what constitutes
support for terror and for the use of violence as a means of advancing the party’s objectives.
It raises the issue of the nature of separatism, of irredenta, and of pan-nationalism. It
problematizes the test for adherence to democracy. It grapples with the effects of emergency
and post-war situations. And it deals with the question how to interpret the objectives of a
party. The case study presents in detailed context and with ample nuances the dilemmas and
doubts that recently came to preoccupy many of Europe’s governments, courts, and regional
institutions. The article does not carry out a comparison or supply explicit normative
conclusions, but provides a unique case study and presents it in a manner that allows readers
to gain the relevant insights for the cases that interest them, lending itself to future
comparisons.
As a byproduct, the story can enlighten those who wish to learn more about the roots
of the present Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The basic problems of this conflict were present
long before the outbreak of the current uprising in 2001 or even the occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza in 1967. They originated in 1948 and before, and were exacerbated in 1967.
They keep coming to the fore of the discussion about the conflict, as exemplified by such
issues as: the lines along which the country is to be divided between Jews and Arabs; the
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extent, if any, of the right of return of the Palestinians; the affiliation of the Arab minority in
Israel with the Palestinian state, the Arab nation, and Islam; the right of Jews to selfdetermination in the form of a Jewish state; the nexus of Israeli Jews to world Jewry and to
the Western powers and culture. These issues, which have lingered for a long time in the
margins of the discussion, became relevant at the height of the Oslo-Camp David peace
process, and although they have been neglected since are likely to resurface in the future.
The return to the pre-1967 roots of the conflict will make the El Ard affair, which preceded
the 1967 war, relevant once again in the following years.
The first objective of the article is to tell the story of the movement and its legal
encounters. It was not a trivial one, as it raises a variety of methodological and
historiographic challenges. The existing historical and political science literature does not
pay sufficient attention to the legal aspects of El Ard’s activities and of the Government’s
responses. The legal and constitutional literature discusses each court ruling and its doctrinal
and jurisprudential significance in isolation from other court decisions and from the
movement’s history as a whole. The only book that discusses all the decisions involving El
Ard is Pnina Lahav’s Judgment in Jerusalem.4 But this book was written as an intellectual
history of Chief Justice Agranat and does not focus on El Ard.
The present article focuses exclusively on El Ard, its history, and its encounters with
the legal system. It does not analyze each of the Supreme Court cases in the context of its
constitutional doctrine and in isolation from the other cases. On the contrary, it highlights
the dynamics between the cases. The article does not deal exclusively with the Supreme
Court but with other legal institutions as well, especially the Attorney General, the Chief
Prosecutor, the Chairman of the Central Elections Commission, and the Registrar of
Companies. It was these institutions and not the Supreme Court that established the legal
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policy with regard to El Ard and to the Arab minority in Israel in general, so these
institutions form a more interesting subject of study than the Supreme Court. In addition to
court records and administrative files the article also uses non-legal documents such as
newspaper articles and political statements.
The article places and interprets the various texts within their historical contexts.
This contextualization takes place at two levels: placing the legal action against El Ard
within the context of the general policy of government agencies vis-à-vis the Arab minority,
and placing the legal activities of El Ard within the political context of the Arab minority in
Israel, of the Palestinian national struggle, and of the Arab world.
Unlike other works, the present article shows the El Ard members as active players
in the story, who not only decided to organize as a political party and set themselves
political goals, but also chose to wage a judicial battle, which they pursued with great
success. They acted in a way that embarrassed the authorities and forced them to take
oppressive legal action. They subjected these actions to judicial review, making sure to
exhaust every legal proceeding and instance. Treating the El Ard movement as a passive
victim leads to the formulation of a story in which there are only two actors: the oppressive
or enlightened state, and a movement that reacts to the actions of the state and suffers its
consequences. This article presents an El Ard movement that initiates action and chooses
from available options. In the past, the El Ard movement has been treated as a victim and as
a result it has never been evaluated critically. Critical Jewish-Israeli historians tended to be
critical toward the Jewish-Israeli subjects of their research because of an ethical sense of
collective responsibility, because of a desire to promote a political agenda of compromise
and peace, and because they possessed better tools (language, archives, research literature,
acquaintance) for being critical of members of their group.

4

Pnina Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century (Berkeley,
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The article begins with a nutshell presentation of the basic story of the El Ard
movement. This is followed by a presentation of the wider context, beginning with the post1948 military rule over Arabs in Israel, moving to political activity within that minority, the
difference between the state responses to El Ard and to the Communist Parties, the finally to
the relationship between El Ard, the Arab world, and the emerging Palestinian national
movement. These contexts are essential for a better understanding of the movement, its
activities, and its objectives. All these finally lead up to the discussion of three decisive
constitutional points of contact between the movement and the court: freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and the right to be elected.

2

The Basic Story
In the first decade of the state, the political activity of the Arab minority in Israel

found three conduits of expression: Arab parties associated with the governing labor larty Mapai, the socialist United Workers Party (Mapam) – that was in the opposition for most
though not all of the period discussed here, and the Israeli Communist Party (Maki). The
establishment of El Ard at the beginning of the second decade as a movement not associated
to those parties was a new phenomenon in the Israeli political landscape. Following the rift
in 1959 in the Arab world between the pro-Soviet camp led by Iraqi leader Abdul Karim
Kassem and between the nationalist, pan-Arab camp of Egyptian president Gamal Abdul
Nasser, tensions developed in Maki, and a group of young Arab intellectuals withdrew from
it. After its separation from Maki toward the end of 1959, the group began to organize an
Arab political movement called El Ard, the first such group without Jewish participation, at
a time when many of the leaders of Maki and about half its voters were Jews. The most
prominent among the leaders of the new movement were Mansur Kardosh, Habib Qa’uqji,
and Sabri Jirys. Unlike the other political alternatives, El Ard offered a pan-Arab national
Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 252-272.
9

platform, not a socialist or communist one. El Ard championed a change in the internal
political arrangement created after Israel’s War of Independence in 1949, and was not
satisfied to struggle for the rights of Arab citizens within the State of Israel as a Jewish state
existing within the borders of that time. El Ard struggled on three fronts to establish its
political status: against the Israeli authorities, against traditional Arab society, and against
Maki. At first, El Ard was organized as an extra-parliamentary political movement, and it
did not run for the Knesset in 1959 and 1961. Its activity consisted of the publication of
newspapers and manifestos, membership drives, the organization of meetings and
assemblies, and the development of an organizational and financial infrastructure. It was
only on the eve of the 1965 elections that the movement submitted a list of candidates for
the Knesset.
The Israeli authorities tried various methods to restrict the activities of El Ard throughout
the years of its existence. The movement chose to confront these attempts by legal means.5
As a result, several attempts to limit El Ard activities were tested in the Supreme Court,
which handed down six important decisions in cases involving El Ard over a five year
period (1960-1965). At first, the movement requested a license to publish a newspaper,
while printing “one-time” sheets, each with a different title and editor to circumvent the
interdiction of the Press Ordinance. The sheets were widely distributed and received
attention. Consequently, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs called a news
conference, warning about the dangers that the activities of the movement represented to the
state, and announced the government’s intention to take drastic steps against it. The
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Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study 111-124 (1971); Sabri Jirys, The
Arabs in Israel (1966). Lahav, supra n. 4, pp. 252-272; I. Amitai, “The Arab Minority in
Israel: The Years of Military Administration, 1948-1966,” in Independence, The First Fifty
Years 129 (Anita Shapira ed., Jerusalem, Israel, 1998).
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newspaper was subsequently shut down, and six of its editors were indicted and convicted in
trial court, a conviction upheld by the district court and the Supreme Court.6
The group continued to operate in the years 1960-1962 in two directions: a request for a
license to publish a weekly and a request to incorporate as an Ltd. for-profit company in the
business of printing and publishing newspapers and books. When the request for a
publishing license was denied, the group petitioned the High Court of Justice against the
District Supervisor of the Interior Ministry, but the court rejected the plea.7 However, when
the group filed a petition against the Registrar of Companies who refused to register the
company, the court granted the petition with a majority of two to one (Agranat and Vitkon
against the minority view of Haim Cohn, who interpreted the language of the law in a literal
way so as to provide the Registrar of Companies absolute discretion).8 The Attorney
General, Gideon Hausner, asked for a further discussion and appeared in person before a
larger panel of five justices. The High Court of Justice did not change its decision, and this
time with a majority of three to two (Agranat, Vitkon, and Sussman against Cohn and Chief
Justice Olshan) instructed the registrar to incorporate El Ard, Ltd.9
The movement, which was unsuccessful in publishing a newspaper, continued to operate in a
lower key: it created branch offices, organized rallies, and marketed shares of El Ard, Ltd.
to expand its membership. As of 1962, it appears that El Ard decided to raise its level of
visibility one notch: it began appealing to the Secretary General of the United Nations, to
the international press, and to foreign ambassadors in Israel.10 The movement also received
open support from Radio Cairo. In 1964 it announced that it was organizing as an Ottoman
6

Cri. App. 60/228 Qa’uqji v. Attorney General, P.D. 14(3) 1929 (henceforth the Qa’uqji case).
High Court of Justice 64/39 El Ard Company, Ltd. v. Supervisor of Northern District, P.D. 18(2) 340
(henceforth the El Ard, Ltd. case).
8
Kardosh case, supra n. 1.
9
Further Discussion 61/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh, P.D. 17(2) 1209 (henceforth Kardosh
Further Discussion).
10
Regarding the non-legal activities of the movement, see High Court of Justice decision 64/253, Jirys v.
Supervisor of Haifa District, P.D. 18(4) 673 (henceforth the Jirys case).
7
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Association – a non-commercial, not-for-profit association – perhaps in preparation to
organizing as a political party and running for the Knesset, since this type of organization
was more suitable for political activity than a for-profit corporation. The District Supervisor
of the Interior Ministry informed members of El Ard that the organization of the movement
as an association is not permitted, and El Ard again petitioned the High Court of Justice.
This time the court decided unanimously to reject the plea and to forbid the movement from
organizing as an association.11 Shortly afterwards several of the prominent activists of the
movement were arrested, and the Minister of Defense declared the El Ard movement illegal
by a decree based on the state of emergency regulations.
In 1965 El Ard decided to run in the elections to the sixth Knesset under the name “The
Socialists List.” The Elections Commission disqualified the list claiming that its candidates
were members in an illegal association, which was banned, and that the objectives of the
association threatened the existence of the State of Israel and its territorial integrity. The
Supreme Court rejected the appeal with a majority of two to one (Agranat and Sussman
against Cohn) and let the disqualification stand.12 With most legal means at its disposal
disallowed and its main activists dispersed, the El Ard movement then ceased to exist for all
practical purposes.13

3

Arab Politics within the Pincers of Military Rule
The 1947-49 war, Israel’s War of Independence began with the Arab rejection of the

UN partition Resolution of November 1947 that called for the formation of a Jewish state
and an Arab state in Palestine-Eretz Israel. The war intensified in May 1948 with the end of
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The Jirys case, ibid.
The Yeredor case, supra n. 2.
13
One of the leaders of the movement, Habib Qa’uqji, later joined the Syrian intelligence service, and was
claimed to have recruited the network of Jewish-Arab spies that was captured in the early 1970s. Another
leader, Sabri Jirys, joined the PLO, began researching the Jewish-Arab conflict, and returned to Israel only
after the signing of the Oslo accords. See Lahav, supra n. 4, footnote 35 on p. 399.
12
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the British mandate in Palestine, the declaration of Independence of the State of Israel and
the military invasion of the neighboring Arab Countries. By the end of the war Israel
controlled territories that were considerably larger than those that were allocated to it in the
UN resolution. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes and
became refugees in what is known in Palestinian collective memory as Al-Nakba (the
“catastrophe”). Some 160,000 Arabs, many of which involved just months earlier in fighting
against the Jews, remained in the newly formed State of Israel and formed nearly 20% of its
population. Most of these Arabs soon received Israeli citizenship, including the right to vote.
The military administration was established in October 1949, at the closing of the
war. It quickly pushed aside the Ministry of Minority Affairs led by Bechor Shalom Shitrit,
which was set up at the time of the establishment of the state. The military administration
lasted eighteen years during which most of the Arab citizens of Israel were ruled by the
army and not by the civilian departments of the government.14 The military administration
held sway over territories that were labeled “closed areas” and “security districts.”
Approximately 75% of Israel’s Arab citizens lived in these areas, which included the
Galilee, Wadi Ara, the “Triangle” (Meshulash), and the Negev. Jewish residents in the same
areas were in practice not subject to the military rule. Arabs who lived outside the areas of
the military administration, for example in Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Ramla, and Lod, were subject
to the military administration only when they wanted to travel to areas that were under
military rule.

14

For a discussion of the political and legal status of Israeli Arabs in the period of the military
administration and of the consequences of their status in this period for their status at later times, see Ian
Lustik, Arabs in the Jewish State, Israel’s Control of a National Minority (University of Texas Press,
Austin, Texas, 1980), Mifras Publishing House, Haifa, 1980; Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour,
Subtenants: Israeli Arabs, Their Status, and the Policy Toward Them (Keter Publishing House, Jerusalem,
Israel 1992); Ori Stendel, The Arabs in Israel, Between the Hammer and the Anvil (Academon, Jerusalem ,
Israel, 1992); Landau, supra n. 9; Ilan Saban, The Legal Status of Minorities in Democratic DeeplyDivided Countries: The Arab Minority in Israel and the Francophone Minority in Canada (PhD thesis
submitted to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 2000); David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of Arabs in
Israel (1990); Baruch Kimerling and Joel Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (1994).
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The legal authority of the military administration was based on the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations enacted in 1945 by the British Mandatory government.15 The regulations
contained some 170 sections and invested the executive branch with broad authority that
trumped regular legislation and allowed the infringement of civil rights. The military
administration used primarily six of the regulations: regulation 125, which allowed limiting
movement within areas declared “closed” and making it conditional upon a permit issued by
the administration; regulation 110, which allowed limiting the movement of individuals and
their placement under police supervision; regulation 109, which allowed the deportation of
people from areas of their residence; regulation 111, which allowed administrative
detention; regulation 124, which allowed the imposition of curfews; and regulation 137,
which regulated the licensing of weapons. The defense regulations of the Mandatory
government, inherited by Israeli law, were in force over the entire territory of the state.
The areas under military rule were unique in that they were administered by a staff under the
command of a governor who was entitled to exercise his authority personally. This
delegation of authority from the Defense Minister made the intensive daily enforcement of
the regulations easy throughout the areas under military rule. The establishment of separate
courts further distinguished the areas under military rule. Judges in these courts were army
officers, usually not jurists, who were in fact part of the military administration. It was not
possible to appeal their decisions.16
Another legal instrument, in addition to the regulations of the Mandatory government, was
the Emergency Regulations (Security Areas) of 1949.17 The regulations were enacted by the
Defense Minister based on his authority under of the Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance of
15

Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Official Gazette Supplement B, p. 855 (henceforth Defense
(Emergency) Regulations).
16
The best analysis of the legal mechanisms of the military administration is in Jirys, supra n. 9.
17
Adriana Kemp, “The Mirror Language of the Border: State Territoriality and National Minorities in
Israel,” Israeli Sociology 2(1) 1999, p. 319, attributes great important to these regulations. Jirys, however,
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194818 and its validity was extended every year until 1972. The regulations established a
protected zone along the borders of Israel (10 km in the north and center, 25 km in the
south) within which the Defense Minister was entitled to designate security zones. The
Israeli regulations were important in the first years, because in addition to the powers based
on regulations of the Mandatory government, they granted the authority to evacuate citizens
from the security areas. These regulations were used to remove residents from these areas
and prevent their return to the villages, among them Iqrit and Birim. Over time, the
importance of the Israeli regulations decreased and the difference was obscured between
closed areas declared by virtue of the Defense Regulations of the Mandatory government
and the security areas established under the strength of the Israeli Emergency Regulations.
The legal framework of the military administration did not determine its nature, because
although it allowed the use of the same legal means toward the Jewish residents of these
areas, it was clear to all that this would not happen. Moreover, it was possible to use other
regulations, in addition to the six, against Arab residents of these areas, but they were not
used. It would have been possible to distinguish between security areas close to the border
and closed areas inside the country, but these areas were administered jointly. It would have
been possible to apply all the defense regulations of the Mandatory government to Arabs as
well as Jews outside the areas of the military administration, but this was hardly ever done.
Even toward the Arab population inside the areas of military rule the policy changed over
the years. Gradually, rules were eased for residents in these areas and many types of
movement were allowed without authorization: movement on specific days, for specific
purposes, to specific areas. Toward the end of the military administration, movement
between settlements and areas was almost entirely free, and collective limitations were

emphasizes the overlap between them and the defense regulations and the similar extent of control that the
administration exercised in border areas and inside the country.
18
Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance
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replaced by individual ones. Thus it was policy and not legal framework that dictated how
the military administration functioned.
What was the policy that guided the military administration? Research reveals that the
purpose of the military rule has not been clearly defined at the outset.19 In the course of the
War of Independence, a new situation arose in which the Jewish state gained control over an
Arab population.20 The situation was fluid. Battles continued, the borders have not been
finalized, and a large Arab population has not yet found its place. The military rule grew out
of the necessity of the moment, in order to replace the military units that had conquered
areas in which the Arab residents did not flee and were not driven out. The main function of
the military administration was to control that population and ensure that it did not become
once more a fighting force against the Jews. At the end of the war, after the armistice
agreements were signed, the problem of refugees trying to return to their homes, referred to
in Israel as “infiltrators,” became a central security issue. In addition, there was the fear of a
“second round” initiated by the Arab states, to attack and destroy Israel, which would be
joined by the Arab residents of the state as a fifth column. It quickly became clear that the
military administration could not address both security threats, which were handled by the
regular army forces, the police, and the General Security Services. The military
administration continued its existence by virtue of bureaucratic inertia and from an
organization with security objectives it became one that promoted the overall political
objectives of the government vis-à-vis the Arab population. The policy was one of making
the Jewish state more Jewish, a process measured by two main indicators: land and
demography. On a more abstract level, the military administration was supposed to
19

Amitay, supra n. 9.
In fact, a situation of this nature was likely to develop in the wake of the partition plan, except that the
international and constitutional mechanisms that were specified in Resolution 181 of the UN Assembly for
the protection of the rights of Arabs in the Jewish state and of Jews in the Arab state have not been fleshed
out. Moreover, were the partition plan to be executed, the subjection of Arab residents to the Jewish state
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discipline and restrain the Arab population to allow the strengthening of the Jewish state.
From a necessity of the moment the military administration became a methodology.
As of the mid 1950s, it was frequently claimed that the military administration no longer
served security or national-Zionist interests but rather the political interests of the ruling
Mapai party. It was claimed that following the Sinai campaign of 1956 (in conjunction with
Anglo-French operations in the Suez Canal) the security threat was not as great as in the
past, and in any case it was being addressed by other agencies. The Jewish makeover of the
state was nearly complete once the refugees were prevented from returning to their homes
and the transfer of many lands from Arab to Jewish hands completed – processes that were
also handled by other agencies.21 The military administration was in the service of Mapai in
two ways: first through direct support of Arab parties affiliated with Mapai, and second by
preventing the organization of independent Arab political parties that may compete with
Mapai.22 In time, critics of the military administration from among Arab activists were
joined by many parties in the Knesset, extending from left to right: Maki, Mapam, Achdut
Ha’avoda, the Liberal Party, and Herut. The growing opposition to the military
administration resulted in several reviews of its justification. In 1949 a committee was set
up under the leadership of minister Shitrit; in 1951 the Knesset decided that the
Constitution, Statute, and Law Committee would prepare a proposal for the abolition of the
Mandatory laws on which military rule was based; in 1955 an investigative commission was
would not have occurred in enmity and by threats, war, and the removal of large numbers of residents from
their homes.
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established under retired general Yochanan Ratner to look into the necessity of the military
administration; after the Kafr Qasim massacre (1956), the need for the military
administration was examined once again; in 1958 a ministerial committee led by Justice
Minister Pinhas Rosen was created to investigate the matter. All through these years, there
was growing criticism of the military administration on the part of intellectuals, nonparliamentary political groups, and even the State Comptroller. In 1962, a proposal to
abolish military rule was rejected in Knesset by a slim majority of 59 to 55. In 1963, a new
proposal to abolish military rule was rejected by a single vote. The balance was tipped by
the votes of two Arab member of Knesset who were compelled by Mapai to vote against
abolition disregarding their views on the matter and at great cost to their political status. It
can be said that in the period of El Ard’s activity, the military administration survived
thanks to the votes of Arab members of the Knesset. The basis of political support for the
military administration gradually shrank in the 1950s and early 1960s, and its continued
existence was possible only by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion applying the full weight
of his personal influence on members of Mapai, the Arab factions associated with it, and the
other members of the government coalition.
After Ben-Gurion resigned, in 1963, the situation changed. His successor, Levy Eshkol,
while he didn’t act to immediately abolish military rule, as many had expected, enacted
several measures of relief. Finally, after three more years and a power struggle between the
supporters and opponents of military rule within the Prime Minister’s office and the security
establishment, Eshkol decided in favor of abolishing military rule. The abolishment was
effected only in November 1966, a year after the disqualification of El Ard and the elections
to the sixth Knesset.23 The civilian functions of the military administration were transferred
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to civilian authorities and the military functions to the regional commands. No legislation
was involved in abolishing military rule. What was abolished in fact was the administrative
mechanism of military rule within the army, not the legal framework of the emergency
legislation that made its operation possible. The Mandatory and Israeli emergency
legislation remained in force. In parallel with the abolishing of military rule over the Arab
population as a whole, individual injunctions remained in force against several hundred
Arab activists who had been black listed under the military administration. Additionally,
limitations on movement continued in several of the closed areas. Abolishment of the
military administration did not result in a comprehensive cancellation of all the limitations
imposed on the Arab minority. Some were abolished gradually before 1966, while others
continued after the military administration ceased to exist.
Mapai used the mechanisms of the military administration to further its political objectives.
The Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs was the linchpin between the party, the
government organs, and the military administration. Through restrictions placed on
movement between the various security and closed areas as well as the individual
restrictions on political activists, the military administration obstructed the formation of a
nation-wide Arab party as it obstructed the activities of the Communist Party. The military
administration handed out various benefits to voters of the parties affiliated with Mapai,
promised before elections to ease restrictions, and its officers appeared on election rallies
together with candidates connected with Mapai. The justification for the political
involvement of the military administration was found in the claim that the relationship
between the Arab population and the ruling party promoted the national interest and
prevented the emergence of security threats.
Mapai tried to use the mechanisms of the military administration to influence Arab voters in
favor of the Arab parties affiliated with it, but there is no evidence that it completely
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succeeded in doing so. At that time, Mapai did not include Arabs in its list of candidates to
the Knesset, and did not allow membership of Arabs in the party, but used affiliated Arab
parties, which were controlled by Mapai leadership and its Arab department. The parties
were created on a regional and ethnic basis designed to attract various groups of voters and
to allow rival groups and clans to support various lists of candidates affiliated with Mapai.
The military administration used the carrot and the stick to induce the Arab population to
vote for these parties. However, in parallel with the military administration, there were
others active in the Arab sector, including the sprawling Maki apparatus; ministries that
were not under Mapai control (Interior, Labor, Transportation, Religious Affairs) and tried
to promote the political interests of their ministers; affiliated parties created by Achdut
Ha’avoda and later Rafi; neighboring kibbutzim belonging to the Shomer Ha’tzair
movement, and others.24 The secrecy of the ballot was largely respected, allowing voters to
vote inside the booth in relative freedom, and numerous Arab citizens were not afraid to
openly abstain from voting in elections to the Knesset.25 With the aid of the military
administration, Mapai achieved significant success among the Arab minority but it was not
all-powerful, not in its ability to perpetuate the military rule and not to further its political
interests.
The El Ard story cannot be told without understanding the administrative and judicial ability
of military rule to intervene in Arab politics. It is impossible to understand the activities of
the military administration and of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs toward
El Ard without considering the central role played by the military administration in
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preserving Mapai’s political power. Finally, it is impossible to understand the story without
grasping the centrality of the struggle to abolish military rule, which reached its zenith in the
years of El Ard’s activity. Obviously, these factors all influenced El Ard’s activity. The
opinion of the Attorney General and the decisions of the Supreme Court were probably also
influenced by these wide and important contexts.

4

The Objectives of El Ard and the Limits of Israeli Politics

It is not easy to know what the objectives of the El Ard movement were. The legal
discussion generally focuses on the “Objectives” section in the articles of organization of
the El Ard association. Objectives A, B, E, and F in the “Objectives” section deal with
“raising the educational, scientific, health, economic, and political level of its members;” the
“establishment of full equality and social justice among all segments of the population of
Israel;” an “action to achieve peace in the Middle East in particular and in the world in
general;” and even “support for all progressive movements worldwide that oppose
imperialism, and support for all peoples that attempt to free themselves from it.” These
objectives were not considered problematic. The discussion focused in general on objectives
C and D, which stated the following:
C. Finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem – by seeing it as an
indivisible unit – according to the will of the Arab Palestinian people, that
provides an answer to its interests and aspirations, returns to it its political
existence, ensures its full and legal rights, and regards it as owner of the
primary right to determine its destiny within the supreme aspirations of the
Arab nation.
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D. Support for the liberation, unification, and socialist movement in the Arab
world, through all legal means, by seeing that movement as a determining
force in the Arab world, and requiring Israel to consider it in a positive way.
Security and law enforcement agencies in Israel claimed that these two objectives must be
interpreted to mean that El Ard categorically denies the right of the State of Israel to exist
and seeks to establish an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire territory of Mandatory
Palestine. El Ard’s attorney in the Jirys and Yeredor cases, Dr. Yaakov Yeredor, offered an
entirely different interpretation, according to which the State of Israel already exists and
hence there is no need to recognize its right to exist, while the Arab people have not yet
obtained their state and it is for this reason that their right to a political existence is
mentioned. But Yeredor, in his interpretation, did not address the question of what will be
the boundaries of the Palestinian political entity and what will be the nexus between it and
the Arab nation as a whole.26
Justice Vitkon, speaking for the court in the Jirys decision, ruled that the objective of the
movement “denies totally and completely the existence of the State of Israel in general, and
particularly the existence of the state within its present borders.” In the Yeredor case, Chief
Justice Agranat reiterated the argument unequivocally: “Before us is a list of candidates
whose aim is the liquidation of the State of Israel.”
Three main types of records used by historians to examine the positions of political
movements and parties are not available in the case of El Ard: party newspapers, Knesset
protocols of debates, and protocols of internal discussions within the movement. Since the
movement was not allowed to issue a newspaper, we do not possess the important source of
a party newspaper such as the ones that can be used by historians of Maki, Herut, or the
workers’ parties. Since the leaders of El Ard did not have the opportunity to be elected to
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the Knesset, its positions cannot be evaluated based on speeches of its members delivered
before the Knesset.
Moreover, it appears that El Ard has not documented its activities formally; there are no
protocols of internal discussions or of binding resolutions, probably as a result of the low
level of formalization within the movement, its organs, and rules, and the fear that the
security agencies or political rivals might get hold of such documentation. Consequently,
there is a great historical lacuna with regard to the official positions of the movement, of its
leaders, its various factions, and its internal organs (if there were such).
One source that survived and has been used by the authorities in legal action against El Ard
are the one-time pamphlets that the movement published under different names toward the
end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, and for the publication of which several El Ard
members were tried. The general tone of the sheets praised pan-Arab nationalism: “The
Arab revival movement, which awoke at the beginning of the current century, is now
storming with awesome force and striking out at foreign influence... It will do its best for the
freedom and unity of the Arab world from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and it is
clear that victory is assured.”27 The Jewish national movement is treated differently: “World
Zionism saw in the [United Nation’s] partition plan a first basic step in the implementation
of its plans in the Arab world and was satisfied for the moment with a portion of the land,
while it secretly plotted to swallow all of Palestine and to prepare in this way the country to
serve as a bridgehead for the conquest of the other Arab states.”28 The refugee question
receives great attention in the pamphlets. The political demand is for the recognition of the
right of return. The writer dismisses Ben-Gurion’s proposal to participate in the relocation
of the refugees in the Arab states as a proposal that will persuade only people “at the mental
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level of a female cook at Sde Boker” (a reference who Ben Gurion’s wife, who lived in
kibbutz Sde Boker). The writer dismisses the claim that there is no room for the refugees by
reminding the readers of the great Jewish immigration and the intention of absorbing three
million Jews from Russia. The writer answers the claim that the refugees hate Jews with the
following: “According to your own ‘good’ judgment, what is your right to live in the heart
of the Arab orient while you abhor its residents and spread hatred between them and your
people.”29 The sheets contain some comparisons between Jewish and Nazi rule, and threats
as to what is awaiting the Jews and their state: “This negative view of Arab nationalism will
by itself, in our view, seal the dark fate of this people.” “It should not be allowed to fade
from the mind of Israel’s rulers that it is time to solve this problem (the problem of the
Palestinian Arabs) in a just way before another sword will solve it, and a what a sword this
will be!”30 The sheets do not specify who will bring these threats to fruition and what is
required of the Jews, other than the return of the refugees, to remove the threat. They
mention the foreignness of the Jews in the Arab east, and there is no recognition of the
existence of a Jewish state, so that it appears that even after the right of return is
implemented the Jews do not have a right to exist within the framework of a state – Jewish,
bi-national, or democratic – that is not part of the Arab nation, and it is possible that there
will be no place for them in the Arab world as individuals either.
Jurists, who examined the affair with the benefit of hindsight and after the fact emphasized
the vagueness of the objectives of El Ard. They focused on the language of the articles of
organization even more than jurists of the period. The latter were influenced to a greater or
lesser extent by the wider context of events and opinions of the time, while the former were
at times treating the text of the articles of organization in isolation from their historical
context. Ruth Gavison’s article “Twenty Years to the Yeredor Decision,” is a good example
28
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of the approach that examines fascinating questions in the Yeredor decision. It is also an
example of an original philosophical and legal discussion, but essentially a-historical and
non-contextual. In several crucial points, while considering whether or not the Yeredor
decision was justified, she treats the objectives of the movement as a question of legal
evidence: “It appears that one of the reasons for the disqualification of El Ard was that the
court believed that in fact the list of candidates represented [such] a combined threat to the
existence of the state. It is not clear what was the evidence in support of this threat...” She
adds in a footnote that it was said that the movement did not recognize the existence of the
state, “but other than the saying of it there is no such evidence.” And later: “I don’t have
data about the positions of El Ard, but based on the decision it appears that its charter did
not include a denial of the right of self determination of the Jewish people.”31 In many cases,
jurists were satisfied with the facts as they appear in the text of the main decisions involving
El Ard; they do so because of their approach whereby the means of investigating the
objectives of El Ard is to peruse legal documents and court decisions, and because of a lack
of ability or interest to carry out a broad and incisive historical research into the objectives
of El Ard.
Historians use different methods to investigate the positions and objectives of El Ard. They
turn to non-legal documents, like the movement’s printed literature. They try to acquire
documentation about conversations and meetings in which its leaders participated. They try
to position the movement in a broad political context, within Israeli as well as Palestinian
and Arab politics. The present article relies on the work of historians to learn about the
positions of El Ard by examining its position relative to competing parties within the
political space of the Arab minority in Israel. The article also analyzes the positions of El
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Ard in relation to the positions of Arab states and the organizations of the Palestinian
national movement at the time.

5

El Ard and the Israeli Communist Parties

Understanding the political positioning of El Ard with relation to Maki, the Israeli
Communist Party, can be indicative of its positions. But first, it is important to understand
the internal tensions within Maki in the years 1957-1965, the period of El Ard’s existence.
Maki was not monolithic. It included both Arab and Jewish members and leaders. It included
members with different views about the nature of subordination to the Soviet Union, about
nationalism, imperialism, the solution to the Jewish-Arab conflict, the leaders of various
Arab countries, and the means and stages necessary to reach the party’s objectives. The
party’s 12th (1952) and 13th (1957) congresses passed similar resolutions according to
which “the State of Israel must recognize the right to self-determination, including
separation, of the Arab people in the Land of Israel... and the right of the refugees to return
to their homeland and be rehabilitated.”32 In retrospect, based primarily on the memoirs of
several of the Jewish leaders published after they had left the party, it appears that this
version of the text was the result of a compromise. The Arab camp demanded the inclusion
in the platform of a demand for the implementation of the 1947 UN partition plan, but the
Jewish camp opposed it. The words “including separation” represented a vague compromise
about this point – with regard to which the camps exchanged their previous positions of
1947-48, when the Jews supported the partition and the Arabs rejected it.33 Since the
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establishment of the Jewish-Arab Israeli Communist Party, in October 1948, its members
did not give free rein to tensions that existed between the Arab and Jewish communists
already during the Mandate,34 but after the 13th party congress, in 1957, it became
impossible to suppress the old tensions, and the internal relations deteriorated. The Arab
camp demanded that in areas of Israel which according to the partition plan were supposed
to belong to the Arab state the party should set up a separate organization as a token of its
refusal to recognize Israel’s right of sovereignty over these areas, but the Jewish camp
prevented this action. Arab members opposed the expression “Israel’s right to exist,” and
wanted to substitute for it the phrase “the right of the Israeli people to self-determination.”
Other members claimed that Israel should withdraw to the 1947 borders before demanding
the recognition of Arab states. In 1958 the tension reached such a pitch that Arab and Jewish
leaders began holding separate discussions in Moscow to persuade the Soviets to support
their side. According to one of the Jewish leaders of the party, Tewfik Toubi, an Arab party
leader, tried to persuade the leaders of the Soviet Union in Moscow that the Soviet support
for the establishment of the State of Israel was a “Stalinist error.” Arab party members
began meeting separately, without the knowledge of the Maki Central Committee. There is
disagreement as to what exactly was discussed at these meetings. Some claim that the Arab
leaders wanted to organize in order to bring the party to change its platform in accordance
with their views or to strengthen their positions within party institutions. Others claim that
the discussion at one of the meetings focused on the possibility of carrying out guerilla
warfare in Israel in the style of the FLN warfare against the French in Algeria, and yet
others maintain that this meeting was taped by the General Security Services (Shabak) and
its content was passed to the party’s Jewish leaders. Opponents of this version of the event
would be guaranteed, and demanded the establishment of a democratic state with a large Arab majority
over the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine.
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claim that it was a Shabak provocation.35 In any case, on May Day 1958 the Nazareth branch
of the party organized a mass rally without police authorization and without the approval of
the party’s national institutions. In the course of the procession a violent confrontation
erupted between police and demonstrators, several of whom were arrested. These events led
to the formation, in the summer of 1958, of the “Arab Front,” which then changed its name
to the “Popular Front” after the District Supervisor refused to incorporate it under the first
name. 36 The front was formed by Arab party activists and nationalist Arab groups from
outside the party despite the disapproval of some of Maki’s Jewish leaders. There is
disagreement as to the connection between the Front and Maki. Some claim that members of
the Front used it to strengthen their position within Maki. A variation of this claim maintains
that the Front was intended to persuade nationalist Arabs to vote for the Communist Party.
Others maintain that the Front was intended to serve as a basis for an Arab organization
outside of Maki.
Because of the heterogeneous composition of the Front, which included both communists
and nationalists, its platform was drafted very cautiously. No Marxist or socialist ideas were
incorporated, nor sensitive issues regarding the Jewish-Arab conflict. The platform dealt
mostly with domestic matters: a demand for the abolition of military rule, a halt to land
expropriation and return of the land to its original owners, abolition of discrimination
between Jews and Arabs, use of the Arab language, and improvement of the educational
system. External aspects were broached only in the demand for the return of the refugees to
the places of their residence.37 It is possible that this compromising formulation was not the
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result of internal disagreements alone but also of fear of intervention on the side of the
authorities.
The Popular Front existed for about a year and was dissolved in July 1959. A crisis in the
Arab world caused its collapse and the creation of El Ard. The crisis developed between the
Egyptian President Nasser, whose first priority was pan-Arab nationalism, and Iraqi
President Kassem, whose first priority was universal communism. The Soviet Union
supported Kassem, and Egyptian-Soviet relations deteriorated. The communist members of
the Popular Front were faced with a difficult dilemma: continue the partnership with the
nationalist, Nasserite members of the Front or toe the Soviet line, which required support for
Kassem and criticism of Nasser? Communist members decided in favor of the Soviet line,
whereas a group of nationalist members split away from the Front and created an
independent political group, which became the founding nucleus of El Ard. The process of
El Ard’s birth reveals much more about its positions than the charter of the movement.
Regarding to the Jewish-Arab conflict, the position of the nationalist group within the
Popular Front, from which El Ard was forged, could not have been less nationalistic than the
opinions, presented above, of the members of the communist group within the Front (that is,
the Arab camp within Maki).
The tension between the Arab and Jewish camps within Maki did not end with the
dissolution of the Popular Front; on the contrary. The Arab camp accused the Jewish camp
and the party’s anti-Nasserite line of being responsible for the severe defeat the party
suffered in the 1959 elections, as a result of which its representation in the Knesset was
reduced from six seats to three. The tension between the camps continued in subsequent
years and reached a new climax on the eve of the 1965 elections. In August 1965 the party
split. The Arab faction, led by Tewfik Toubi and Emil Habibi, together with a few Jewish
leaders headed by Meir Wilner, established Rakah (The New Communist List).The Jewish
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camp, headed by Moshe Sneh, Shmuel Mikunis, and Esther Vilenska, remained mostly
within Maki (the Communist Party). El Ard chose to run for the Knesset precisely in 1965,
right after the communist split and in the first election contested by a party (Rakah) whose
membership and voters were preponderantly Arab and whose platform emphasized the Arab
national issues. The division of Maki is the key to understanding the spot El Ard was
attempting to stake out for itself in the elections, in which it ended up not participating
because of its disqualification and subsequent loss in the Yeredor case. The controversy that
caused the rift within Maki did not relate to communist doctrine or to the struggle between
Trotskyites and Leninists, or between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communists; the
controversy had to do with the party’s position on the Jewish-Arab conflict.38 To this, a
personal component was added, in the form of age-old personal rivalries between Wilner,
Mikunis, and Sneh. A central controversy between the camps involved the interpretation of
the narrative about the establishment of the State of Israel. While the Arab camp viewed the
establishment of the state as an act of Anglo-American imperialism, and saw in its existence
an imperialist bridgehead, the Jewish camp maintained that the state was established by the
people of Israel with the support of the Soviet Union and other progressive countries.
Moreover, the Jewish camp claimed that when it condemned Arab nationalism and
chauvinism together with Jewish nationalism and chauvinism, the Arab camp accused it of
campaigning against the Arab anti-imperialist movement. The main controversies involved
the party’s position on such matters as the UN partition plan; whether to demand the
physical return of the refugees or a formula that would allow the refugees to choose between
return and reparations; whether Israel should first acknowledge Palestinian rights or should
the Arab states recognize Israel’s right to exist; Arab attitude toward leaders who are calling
for the destruction of Israel; whether the conflict can be solved before the connection
38
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between Israel and American imperialism is severed, or should the link be severed first and
only then the conflict resolved. At the root of the controversy there was also a pragmatic
issue: should the party present a more nationalist platform to attract more Arab voters, or a
platform that is less Arab-nationalist and more communist-socialist to retain the support of
its Jewish voters and the ties with the leftist Zionist parties?39 In many ways, the split of
1965 was a replay of the split of 1943, when tensions between Arabs and Jews caused the
collapse of class- and ideology-based solidarity.
In the 1965 elections El Ard didn’t look to compete with the Jewish-Arab Maki of the
previous elections, a party that promoted formulas for compromise in the Jewish-Arab
conflict, recognized unequivocally Israel’s right to exist, and struggled to make up its mind
in the question of borders (1949 or 1947) and of the refugees’ right of return (return to their
homes or substitutes for it). El Ard looked to compete with Rakah, a new party, on the verge
of forming a more Arab-nationalist platform and no longer satisfied with compromises that
had been reached in the past fifteen years within Maki. El Ard no doubt sought to
accomplish more than the nationalist camp did when it formulated the objectives of the
Popular Front in 1958-1959, and in which the right to return had already been included. El
Ard was a pro-Nasserite movement, a luxury that was denied Rakah because of its
allegiance to directives from the Kremlin. Therefore, El Ard was more pan-Arab than Rakah
and emphasized Arab nationalism, rather than local Arab nationalism, as did the Iraqi
regime toward which Maki, and after it Rakah, were leaning.
What is the connection between the analysis of the objectives of the movement and the
question of its disqualification from the elections in 1965 and the denial of its leaders’ right
to be elected? Why was El Ard disqualified and not Rakah? In what respects are their
platforms and objectives similar and how do they differ? It appears that both parties
Communist Party of Israel, 1965; Nahas, supra n. 34, pp. 55
- 75.
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supported the return of the refugees to the Jewish state; both parties appear to have
maintained that the 1949 borders must change. Three main constraints limited Rakah in its
leaning toward Arab nationalism. First, the party was compelled to toe the Soviet line. This
line recognized Israel’s right to exist and the Soviet Union recognized Israel de jure after the
state was established, whether within the 1947 UN Partition Resolution or the 1949
armistice borders – an issue that was intentionally left in a haze. The Soviet line welcomed
communists from both Israel and the Arab states into the international communist camp.
Second, the party was bi-national even if the overwhelming majority of its voters was Arab.
As a result, its Arab leaders consented to certain limitations in consideration of the Jewish
leaders and of the continued dialog with them. Third, the party was determined to retain its
legitimacy in the eyes of the authorities and not to bring about a test of the legality of its
activities and institutions. Rakah was aware of El Ard’s confrontation with Israeli law and
did not want to follow in its footsteps. The difference between El Ard and Rakah and
between their platforms was rooted in these three constraints. At least until the 1967 war,
Rakah demanded a return to the 1947 borders but not the cessation of Israel’s existence.
Rakah was anti-Zionist in the sense that it viewed Zionism as a reactionary, bourgeois
political movement dependent on imperialism and not a movement of national liberation.
But Rakah did not reject the right for self-determination of the Jews in Israel. It also tried to
dissociate itself from calls by Arab leaders for the destruction of Israel. It recognized the
existence of such a position but claimed that the Israeli side inflated it as well as and the
annihilation threat to Israel. It claimed further that chauvinistic tendencies were temporary
and likely to disappear with the advance of socialism in the Arab world.40 Apparently El Ard
did not agree with this position. Had it agreed, it would have associated itself with the Arab
camp within Maki, encourage it to secede, and establish with it, after the secession, a
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common political front, similar to the Popular Front of 1958. A front or party including
communists who had already achieved political legitimacy and seats in the Knesset would
have had a clear advantage from El Ard’s point of view because the authorities would have
had greater difficulty limiting its activities.

6

El Ard and the Arab World

Did El Ard recognize Israel’s right to exist in the sense that Rakah did? To answer this
question it is necessary to discuss the position of the Arab countries toward Israel’s
existence and the nexus between El Ard and these countries.
In the first half of the 1960s the Arab world was divided into two main camps: a royalist,
conservative camp with Western connections, represented primarily by Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, together with Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, and as a second tier, even Iran; and a
radical, revolutionary, republican camp, connected with the Soviet block, whose most
prominent representatives were Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.41 It was the radical camp that was
active in the Israeli-Arab conflict and in urging the resolution of the Palestinian problem.
Countries in the royalist camp were apprehensive that an intensification of the conflict and
especially of the issue of Palestinian status, would undermine the stability of their regimes
and would cause a deterioration in their relations with the Western countries that supported
them. Of these, the situation of Jordan was the most complex because it had annexed the
West Bank of the Jordan river and granted Jordanian citizenship to its Palestinian residents,
which was contrary to the interests of the Palestinian organizations.
During the time of El Ard’s activity, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq maintained that Israel had no
right to exist as a state with a Zionist, Jewish, or any other identify. In their view, for
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ideological, historical, and political reasons, Israel would have to cease to exist within the
Arab space,42 and its place must be taken by an Arab Palestinian state over the entire
territory of Mandatory Palestine, connected to the Arab nation in general. Each of these
states hoped to extend its sponsorship to the Palestinian state, when it was to be established,
and hence the three did not act in complete concert. At the rhetorical level, the leaders of the
three countries competed with each other, especially at times of inter-Arab tensions, in
statements about the need to destroy Israel, and at times even about their ability to do so
soon.
As to how this objective was to be achieved, opinion was divided and it changed from time
to time. In the years 1959-63, Iraqi President Kassem developed the “vision of the eternal
Palestinian republic.” He proposed to implement the vision in stages: first in Palestinian
areas that were under Arab control, that is, the West Bank (that had been annexed by Jordan)
and the Gaza Strip (which was under Egyptian military control), and afterwards in all of
Palestine. In this conception, the Palestinians, under the leadership of the Mufti, Haj Amin
al-Huseini (who was the religious and political leader of Palestinian Arabs until 1948),
would liberate the portions of their land from under Israeli control using as their basis the
lands that were under Arab control. This conception followed the Algerian model and was
expected to take place with the aid of the Arab countries.43 This vision was opposed
vigorously not only by Jordan but also by Nasser’s Egypt, who believed that it was first
necessary to build up the Arab military capability for victory over Israel. He maintained that
the united Arab countries would lead the liberation war, that new institutions should be
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created to represent the Palestinian people, and supported the establishment of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) in May 1964. The army of the PLO was integrated within the
Egyptian army and did not carry out independent operations. Nasser spoke of a Palestinian
entity and was not specific as to whether in the end there would be an independent state in
Palestine or would Palestine form part of a united Arab nation that he envisioned. A
somewhat similar controversy developed between Egypt and Syria after the dissolution of
the United Arab Republic, and especially after the rise to power of the Baath party in
Damascus, in 1963.44 Although Syria did not champion the establishment of a Palestinian
state on the Palestinian territories under Jordanian and Egyptian control, it was more
militant than Egypt with regard to the timing of the military confrontation with Israel. Syria
was willing to take the risk that the water diversion enterprise aimed at depriving Israel of
disputed Jordan river water would lead to a wider war with Israel. Like Iraq, Syria also
spoke about a popular war of liberation modeled after Vietnam and Algeria as a possible
alternative to a conventional, frontal confrontation,45 and began to support Yasser Arafat’s
El Fatah movement, which as of January 1965 carried out incursions into Israel and
operations against water targets, and later against additional civilian targets.
The diplomatic initiative of Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian President, who tried to bring
about a breakthrough in the Jewish-Arab conflict, is relevant to the present discussion first
because of its proximity to the climax of the El Ard story: the Bourguiba initiative and
reactions to it occurred in the first half of 1965; second, because reaction to the initiative is
instructive as to the basic approach of Arab states toward Israel and the means of
confronting it; third, because the initiative allows us to examine the entire space of possible
opinions within El Ard regarding the solutions to the Palestinian problem and the future of
the State of Israel.
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At the beginning of 1965, Bourguiba initiated a diplomatic drive to break the deadlock in the
Israeli-Arab conflict and to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. He recommended that
the Arab states agree to recognize the existence of Israel and that Israel agree to carry out all
the UN resolutions, in particular the partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181) and
the decision regarding the return of the refugees (General Assembly Resolution 194). Other
Arab leaders, among them Nasser, have occasionally demanded the implementation of UN
resolutions, but were not specific as to what was required of Israel and did not offer to
recognize Israel in return for the implementation of the resolutions. The great innovation in
Bourguiba’s position was the indication of a willingness to coexist with Israel. Bourguiba’s
offer produced great anger in Arab countries and among Palestinians. Nasser and the
Egyptian newspapers led the charge. It was claimed that Bourguiba betrayed the Palestinian
cause. There were those who said that the refugees would return only to an Arab Palestine
and not to a Zionist Israel. Others added that what was taken by force would be returned
only by force and not by negotiations, that this was the only way to restore the honor injured
in 1948.46
Battered and isolated, Bourguiba explained that a return to the partition borders did not
represent the end of the conflict. Acceptance of the partition resolution was a tactical step
intended to isolate Israel in the international community if it refused to comply. If Israel
accepted the partition, it would be possible to establish a Palestinian state within the
partition borders and continue from there the struggle against Israel.47 It is difficult to
determine whether Bourguiba had initially intended the implementation of UN resolutions as
a basis for a final peace agreement and only later, and apologetically, changed his
explanation, or had from the outset offered the adoption of a phased approach to the
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destruction of Israel by realizing that Egypt and Syria did not possess the ability to defeat
Israel in a direct military confrontation. But even the explanations offered by Bourguiba did
not quell Arab criticism against him. Nasser and others perceived an acceptance of UN
resolutions that recognized Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, even as a tactical move,
as a dangerous deviation that was liable to be misunderstood by the Arab public and prevent
the later realization of the objective.48
The Bourguiba affair also sheds a great deal of light on the objectives of El Ard and shows
that the maneuvering room available to Arabs in presenting proposals for the resolution of
the conflict was very limited. When Bourguiba tried to step outside it, he was attacked from
all directions and forced to retreat or at least to greatly obscure his proposal. El Ard could
not have offered at that time a proposal similar to Bourguiba’s without exposing itself to
severe criticism in the Arab world. It is clear that there were among the Arab minority in
Israel many who openly recognized Israel’s right to exist within its borders at the time, but
they were active in the Zionist parties or close to them. They relied on Israel’s political and
military power and did not expect recognition from Arab countries. The communists also
recognized Israel’s right to exist, within the 1949 or the 1947 borders, but unlike Bourguiba,
Arab communists in Israel derived the legitimacy of this stance from the Soviet superpower.
El Ard, as a pan-Arab nationalist party, did not rely on Israel or the Soviet Union for the
purpose of legitimizing its position. The movement had difficulty developing an
independent position regarding the conflict, and it found it easer to support, openly or by
implication, the position of the leading Arab countries. It is difficult to believe that Radio
Cairo would have supported El Ard and called for a vote for El Ard only months after it
attacked Bourguiba, if El Ard held views similar to Bourguiba’s or even more conciliatory.
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The positions of El Ard, swaying in the whirlwind of the Arab world, were influenced by
events in that world. In the early days of the Popular Front, the movement was strongly
influenced by Nasser’s charismatic leadership. During the conflict between Nasser and
Kassem, Maki leaned toward Kassem and El Ard toward Nasser, causing the break-up of the
Front. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the United Arab Republic, El Ard again leaned
toward Nasser and viewed the Syrian withdrawal from unification with Egypt as a blow to
Arab unity. El Ard did not identify with the countries that maintained that the Palestinians
must play an active and important role in the liberation of Palestine. The movement
identified with Nasser, who believed that the time for the liberation of Palestine has not yet
arrived, and that the way to make it happen was to build up the conventional military forces
of Egypt and the Arab states and bring about cooperation among their countries. The Arab
minority in Israel would therefore have to await that time but they had no central role to
play in expediting it, and if they had any role to play at all, it was political and
propagandistic, not military.

7

El Ard and the Palestinian National Movement

In the years after the Al-Nakba, the Palestinian political entity dissolved and the
independent political representation of Palestinians was lost.49 Palestinian representation in
the Arab League and outside it was entrusted to Arab leaders. For about a decade the
question of the Palestinian entity was pushed aside, as Palestinians were deprived of
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effective political representation. In parallel, there were signs of a waning of Palestinian
nationalism. In 1959 Nasser raised the issue of the Palestinian entity as part of a radical,
nationalist Arab movement that he proposed to lead. The process of awakening reached its
climax in May 1964 with the establishment of the PLO under Egyptian sponsorship, and in
January 1965 with the beginning of the military strikes within Israel by El Fatah, under the
leadership of Arafat and with Syrian backing.
In the period during which El Ard was active a formative turning point occurred in the
history of Palestinian activity outside Israel. From a bird’s eye view, the appearance of El
Ard, its activity, and objectives seem to be part of this process. Both were driven by a young
generation that opposed the traditional leadership and the generation of the Al-Nakba. Both
were inspired by the rise of various shades of Arab nationalism, and especially by Nasser.
Nevertheless, the direct connection between the two seems loose. The new Palestinian
organizations did not rely on the Arab minority in Israel to serve as a bridgehead or fifth
column, as had not the Arab states in 1948. The PLO, whose Palestinian headquarters were
in the Gaza Strip, was subordinate to the Egyptian policy and not given political or military
freedom of action. El Fatah, organized in Syria with its support, and used by it to jab at
Nasser, operated mostly from Jordanian territory. El Fatah did not appear to have tried at the
time to establish a presence in the West Bank or in Israel. It operated by carrying out attacks
and withdrawing, without trying to obtain assistance from the Arab minority in Israel. It
could be that El Fatah feared that local Arabs might refuse to take part in these actions or
that approaching them would expose the El Fatah people to the Israeli security agencies.
There is no indication of the Arab minority in Israel joining any Palestinian organizations
that used violent means against Israel before the 1967 Six Day War. And there are only few
known cases in which members of the Arab minority in Israel provided intelligence to
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Palestinian organizations or to Arab armies.50 Moreover, there is no indication of El Ard
people organizing to carry out terror activities before the movement was disqualified from
running for the Knesset in 1965. And there is no information pointing toward any substantial
relationship at that time, military or political, between members of El Ard and the PLO or El
Fatah. It has been claimed that Egyptian and Syrian intelligence agents sought contact with
El Ard activists and that infiltrators sent by Arab intelligence services were apprehended
around the border with letters for El Ard members.51 But there are no unclassified sources
attesting to the fact that El Ard members initiated such contacts or cooperated with these
organizations, not even among material written by former officers of the security services,
members of the military administration, and the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab
Affairs. In later years, some former El Ard members made contact with the Syrian
intelligence (Qa’uqji) and with the PLO (Jirys), but this does not imply that such contacts
had been made before the movement was disqualified from running for the Knesset. Indeed,
it is possible that the contact was established precisely because the authorities shut down all
legal means of Arab political activity in Israel before El Ard. And it is possible that the
contacts were established only after these activists had left Israel.
There is a similarity between the language in which the PLO objectives are couched, as they
appear in the Palestinian National Charter, and the objectives of El Ard listed in the articles
of organization and in publications of the movement. The Charter was drafted by Ahmad
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Shukayri, and it was ratified by the founding congress of the PLO on June 2, 1964.52 Section
1 of the Charter states: “Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an
indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the
Arab nation.” Section 2 adds: “Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British
Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.” Section 3 says: “The Palestinian Arab people
possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after
achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their
own accord and will.” According to Section 4: “The people of Palestine determines its
destiny when it completes the liberation of its homeland in accordance with its own wishes
and free will and choice.”53 Objective C in the objectives section of the El Ard articles of
organization contains central components of the Charter sections quoted here.
There is no complete identity between the Charter and the El Ard objectives. The two
documents were drafted at the beginning of 1964, and I don’t know whether El Ard
members possessed a copy of the Charter at the time they requested the right to incorporate.
It is possible that both documents drew on the same pool of ideas about Palestinian
nationalism and the Arab nation, which were current in the Nasserite world in the early
1960s, and that the El Ard drafters did not import material directly from the Charter.
Statements similar to those in the remaining sections of the 1964 Charter, which is more
moderate than the 1968 revision, cannot be found in El Ard documents. These sections state
that the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are by definition void,
that the Balfour declaration and the definition of the British Mandate are considered void,
that the claims about the historical and cultural connection between the Jewish people and
52
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Palestine are incompatible with historical facts, that Judaism, as a heavenly religion, is not
national movement, that the Jews are not one people, that Zionism is a fascistic, aggressive,
racist, imperialistic movement in its intentions and means. An accepted interpretation of
Section 7 of the Charter is that Jews who arrived in Palestine after 1947 will not be
considered Palestinians and will not be allowed to remain in Palestine.54 The solution
adopted by the PLO at the time of its foundation, inspired by Nasser and sanctioned by him,
opposed the acceptance of the partition plan and opposed the establishment of a democratic
state in the entire territory of Palestine even after the right of return has been realized. The
solution involved the departure of most of the Jews from Palestine (ethnic cleansing, in
current vocabulary) and the establishment of a Palestinian-Arab state over the entire
territory of Mandatory Palestine. The question of whether Palestine included also the East
Bank of the Jordan was intentionally left vague.
Did El Ard adopt the Palestinian National Charter? El Ard did not explicitly include within
its objectives the statements of the Charter, and could not have done so in any case given
that its leaders were under Israeli military rule. Had El Ard adopted these statements it could
not have challenged the Israeli government and legal systems. None of the El Ard
documents or statements of its leaders that have been examined for the present article
contain a clear answer to the question of what El Ard’s position was with regard to the
Charter. mention of the “establishment of full equality and social justice among all segments
53
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of the population of Israel” shows a recognition of Israel’s existence and a desire to take
action within the Israeli system. But mention of “steps toward achieving peace in the Middle
East” does not necessarily imply a peace that recognizes Israel’s right to exist, as the
Charter also declares itself in support of peace in the area but states that this can be achieved
only after the complete liberation of Palestine. The “support for the liberation, unification,
and socialist movement in the Arab world, through all legal means” indicates pan-Arab
aspirations that are not necessarily compatible with life within a Jewish state, but also a
desire to promote these goals through legal means. At the same time, the perception of that
national liberation movement as “a determining force in the Arab world, and requiring Israel
to consider it in a positive way” resembles in its ultimative formulation the calls in the
Charter to consider only the will of the Arab Palestinian people. El Ard did not explicitly
state whether its final target was an Israel within the 1949 borders following the return of
the refugees, an Israel within the partition borders, a binational state, a secular a-national
state on the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine (with or without Jordan), or a
Palestinian-Arab state on the entire territory of Palestine. It is reasonable to assume that its
final objective was different from that of the Communist Party, whose objective shifted
between a binational state and a secular democratic state, and which did not mention the
possibility that a portion of the Jews would not be included among the citizenry. It is
reasonable to assume that El Ard’s position was closer to that of the national Palestinian
movement sponsored by Nasser, or it would not have challenged Rakah in the Knesset
elections but try to form a common front with it in the spirit of the Front of 1958.
The Israeli public, like the Supreme Court, was greatly influenced by what was said in the
Arab press about El Ard. Here is what Justice Vitkon says with regard to Jirys: “No wonder
that the El Ard movement received enthusiastic praise from Arab nationalist propaganda
earlier, whether he supported Section 7 of the 1964 Charter, which stated that Jews who arrived after 1947
would be forced to leave Palestine, or opposed this more lenient section.
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organs that incite to the destruction of Israel day and night, as we learned from newspaper
clippings and Radio Cairo broadcasts supplied by the Attorney General.”55 Similarly,
members of the Elections Commission (quoted by Justice Cohn in the Yeredor decision)
mention the cheering of El Ard by Radio Cairo. It was claimed that the Saut El Arab radio
station, broadcasting from Cairo to the Arab world, called explicitly on the Arab minority in
Israel, on the eve of the election in 1965 and before El Ard was disqualified, to vote for its
list.56 There is no basis to the statements of Knesset members and justices that allude to the
fact that the Arab countries supported El Ard because they were behind its establishment
and were controlling it, since El Ard was established by local initiative inside Israel. The
statements also allude to the fear that El Ard may become a fifth column in time of war, but
the basis for that fear is not clear. But there is a basis to the claim that the support for El Ard
in the Egyptian media was intended to show that El Ard’s positions enjoyed Nasser’s
approval. Nevertheless, the fact that unlike in previous Israeli elections, the Egyptian media
called on the Arab minority in Israel to vote in the 1965 elections, was a novelty. Obviously,
Nasser did not call on the Arab minority in Israel to recognize Israel and vote for the Zionist
parties, but wanted to use Israeli democracy to further his own policy aims; to do so, he was
prepared to use the institutions of the Zionist state, which he had not done in the past.
To summarize El Ard’s objectives and connections: the movement was not satisfied with the
abolition of military rule and the advance of equality for the Arab minority in Israel based
on the existing political reality. The movement wanted to change the status quo established
in 1949. It sought the return of the refugees and the return of the lands to their previous
owners. It sought to change the borders and establish an Arab state. Unlike Bourguiba, El
Ard apparently was not satisfied with the land intended for this state by the partition plan
and sought to establish this state on all the territory of Palestine. It spoke loosely about the
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right of the State of Israel to exist, but did not specify the conditions subject to which this
state would be recognized. El Ard recognized the State of Israel de facto by requesting to be
legally registered as an association, and eventually changed its position from boycotting the
elections to trying to take part in them. In its statements, it supported Nasser’s Egypt, which
proposed the destruction of Israel through the use of force and the establishment of a
Palestinian entity in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine, but did not explicitly
support this component of the Egyptian policy. El Ard members probably would not have
opposed Egypt in implementing this component, and perhaps would have gladly accepted it.
Egypt supported El Ard in its statements and called on its constituents to vote for its list. El
Ard did not explicitly refer to the national Palestinian movement that existed outside Israel,
in its various incarnations, including El Fatah and the PLO. There is a similarity between the
objectives of El Ard and the first sections of the Palestinian National Charter. El Ard did not
refer to the subsequent sections of the Charter, which rejected the partition of the land, the
recognition of any type of national rights of the Jews, and the rights of Jews who arrived
after 1947 to live in Israel. But there is no clear statement by El Ard opposing any of it. El
Ard did not call on its members to use force, but neither did it oppose the use of force by
others to further its objectives and the wishes of the Palestinians and the Arabs. It did not
call for a resolution of the conflict by peaceful means only, but its members do not seem to
have been involved in violence and did not make preparations for such involvement.

8

Choosing the Courts as the Arena for Political Struggle

The legal struggle between the authorities and El Ard provides insight into the patterns of
political activity among the Arab minority before the abolition of military rule. Arab
political activity at that time was influenced by the legal framework in which it operated.
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The Mandatory emergency regulations57 granted the security forces wide ranging powers
that held sway over the entire territory of the country, and in principle over Jews as well.
But as mentioned above with regard to Arab citizens, these powers were supplemented by
the executive organs of the military administrators who were ready to use them, and by areas
declared closed areas or security zones where numerous restrictions on movement were
imposed. Using a range of legal means, the authorities had many ways of blocking political
activity that appeared threatening to them. The political activity of El Ard was restricted and
regulated by these legal means.
At the same time, El Ard chose to pursue an puzzling legal approach. The movement could
have cut all contact with the authorities and denied their legitimacy through demonstrative
disregard, public protest, civil disobedience, or violence. But it chose to act within the rules
of the Israeli political game and test its limits. El Ard may have been caught in this legal
battle for lack of an alternative. In some of the cases the movement was dragged into court
by the authorities. But the leeway that the law allowed for maneuvering was small to begin
with, and although any attempt to extend the activity resulted in legal confrontation, it
appears that the movement itself chose the tactics of legal confrontation and succeeded in
reaching the Supreme Court six times between 1960 and 1965. This pattern of operation
resembles that of civil rights organizations in the US, such as the ACLU and NAACP,
especially regarding the rights of African-American people, around the same time, that is,
the years following Brown v. Board of Education (1954),58 which ruled racial segregation in
education to be illegal and paved the way for frequent litigation by organizations
representing the black population and other minorities for the improvement of their
conditions.
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El Ard was able to raise before the Supreme Court difficult questions of principle, which
was not an easy matter. Under the military administration, Arab political activity in Israel
was controlled through the Mandatory Defense (Emergency) Regulations.59 The regulations
granted broad powers to the security agencies. On the authority of regulation 125, some
areas were declared closed. On the authority of regulations 109 and 110, the freedom of
movement of people was curtailed. On the authority of regulation 111, people were placed
under administrative detention. These and other regulations were used to limit the political
activities of Arabs in Israel. It was possible to object to injunctions based on these
regulations only through the courts of the military administration, benches composed of
officers who were not jurists.60 It was very difficult to attack the implementation of these
regulations through the High Court of Justice, because this court has repeatedly stated in its
decisions since the establishment of the state that it would not interfere with the discretion
of the security agencies when they issued injunctions based on the Defense Regulations, but
would limit itself to verifying the authority of the agency that issued the injunction, and the
observance of the formal requirements necessary before and at the time when the injunctions
were issued.61 El Ard reached the Supreme Court despite the barrier posed by the Defense
Regulations,62 by succeeding in testing government actions that were not based on the
authority of the Defense Regulations63 but on that of the Company Law and the Ottoman
Association Law, or were without legal authorization, as when the Central Elections
Commission disqualified the El Ard list.
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The decision to pursue a legal tactic is not surprising in view of the personalities involved.
Most of the members of the group were intellectuals, or at least people with college
education. Some claim that the movement started at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in
the mid 1950s, indeed within the Law School of that university, from where some of the El
Ard members had graduated. Sabri Jirys, one of the prominent members of the group, was a
graduate of the Hebrew University Law School. Jirys frequently initiated legal actions, and
in his writing, for example in his book Arabs in Israel, he demonstrates a thorough
understanding of the legal methods of action of Israeli authorities toward the Arab minority.
The group also enjoyed the continuous support of Dr. Yaakov Yeredor, an attorney and
founder of the Semitic Action group (together with Nathan Yellin-Mor and Uri Avnery), and
one of the former leaders (before 1948) of the left-wing of the Fighters for the Freedom of
Israel group (Lehi). Yeredor represented the movement in the El Ard Ltd., Jirys, and Yeredor
cases. In the Kardosh case the movement was represented by attorney Hanna Nakara, a
leader of Maki and one of the prominent Arab lawyers of the time. (He also represented,
among others, the newspaper Al-Ittihad in the famous Kol Ha’am case before the High
Court of Justice.)64 Attorney Arie Marinsky, a former member of the National Military
Organization (Etzel) and a lawyer in Shmuel Tamir’s office, must also be mentioned as
someone who did nor recoil from confrontation with the Mapai establishment and
represented Qa’uqji and his five colleagues in the case bearing his name. It appears,
therefore, that the leaders of the movement were able to see the potential of the legal battle,
and were able to mobilize the necessary professional assistance to carry on the battle. It is
likely that the legal tactics of El Ard were shaped by Jirys and Yeredor. Thus, they played a
role resembling Thurgood Marshall’s (who eventually became the first black justice in the
US Supreme Court) in the black civil rights movement in the US.
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In the manner of political interest groups representing blacks, women, and other minorities
in the US, and that of similar groups in Israel during a later period, El Ard chose to act
through the judiciary because as a small minority group that was not considered a potential
political partner, it understood that it would not be able to achieve its goals through the
executive or legislative branches of government. Its tactics involved filing various requests
with the authorities, and when these responded to the challenge, rejected the requests, and
imposed restrictions on the movement, El Ard tested the restrictions in the courts. The
movement used this approach consistently, and did not miss an opportunity to submit a
petition or to appeal a decision, exhausting all available proceeding to the highest instance:
the Supreme Court. It brought many difficult legal challenges to the judicial branch. The
purpose of the legal struggle was not only to win the proceedings and pursue a given
political activity but also to compel the security agencies to reveal their methods of
oppression and discrimination, to present the Supreme Court as part of the oppressive
mechanism of the government, and to present before the Arab public a higher level of
activity than that of competing parties.
This characteristic of El Ard, as a movement that carried on a legal battle against the judicial
system in Israel, was neglected by both legal scholars and historians. The legal scholars did
not fathom the meaning of the successive litigations. Some did not take the trouble to ask
why and how did the need arise to decide about the right to be elected in 1965. Others were
satisfied with the answer that the elections happened to be held just when a new movement
happened to come into being. The historians identified the succession, but some of them
regarded these as a succession of legal restrictions that the state was imposing on the
movement. Historians who are not jurists are less aware of this pattern of legal action, and
do not identify the fact that members of El Ard were an active and initiating party in the
confrontation. Other historian claimed that El Ard sought to benefit from the protection of
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the law because its chances of operating underground were slim and because it found it
difficult to draft supporters for illegal activities.65

9

How the Supreme Court Grappled with the El Ard Challenges

The insight that active litigation was characteristic of the El Ard movement is necessary to
understand this litigation and the court decisions involving the movement and its members.
The legal campaign of El Ard forced the Supreme Court to address central issues in the area
of constitutional law: the freedom of association, freedom of the press, the right to be
elected, the extent of judicial supervision over government agencies in matters of security,
and the place that basic constitutional principles and natural law occupy in cases where there
is no legislation. Freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the right to be elected
are each considered separately below.

9.1

Freedom of Expression (Qa’uqji, Kardosh, El Ard., Ltd.)

When it started its activity, El Ard sought to publish a newspaper, as political parties and
movements at the time usually did, and requested permission to do so from the District
Supervisor. Probably assuming that the Supervisor was temporizing and intended to reject
the request, El Ard did not wait for the answer and tried to circumvent the prohibition
against publishing a newspaper without a permit by issuing several purportedly one-time
sheets, under different names, but with the words El Ard present in the heading of each
sheet. The District Supervisor rejected El Ard’s request and at the same time the state
decided to indict the publishers of the unauthorized one-time sheets.
From this difficult starting point, El Ard and its representatives succeeded in bringing about
a discussion of the extent of freedom of expression in three separate legal actions: first in
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defending the Qa’uqji case66, in which criminal action was taken against several members of
the movement for publishing a newspaper without a permit; second in petitioning the
Kardosh case, which addressed the legality of the refusal of the Registrar of Companies to
register a company the objective of which is the publication of newspapers; third in
petitioning the case of El Ard Ltd.,67 in which the Interior Ministry’s Supervisor of the
Northern District refused to grant the company, after it has been allowed to incorporate, a
permit to publish a weekly newspaper.
Despite El Ard’s attempt to place the freedom of expression and of the press in the center of
the legal discussion, and despite the broad protection of this freedom that was formed in the
Kol Ha’am ruling of 1953,68 in which the High Court of Justice ordered the cancellation of
the closure injunction issued by the Interior Minister against the newspapers of the
Communist Party, the Supreme Court avoided addressing the extent or applicability of
freedom of expression in all three cases in which El Ard brought them up. The proceedings
in the Qa’uqji case69 were a second-round appeal concerning the severity of punishment for
the publication of a newspaper without a permit. Attorneys for the defendants, Marinsky and
Segal, claimed in their appeal that the offenses of the defendants were merely technical: a
failure to obtain permits for the publication of one-time sheets, and that the severity of the
punishment was influenced by the content of the expression and not by the gravity of the
offense. In this way, El Ard hoped to expand the scope of the discussion to the content of
the one-time sheets and the limits of the freedom of expression. They claimed that in the
lower instances the content of these sheets has not been discussed based on facts, and that
the content in itself was not illegal. Refusal of the license, they claimed, denied one of the
basic rights of citizens of the state and the severe punishment reflected the political views of
66
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the judges. The Attorney General helped the court by removing from the original indictment
counts that were based on provisions of the criminal law, such as incitement, which would
have required a discussion of the content of the sheets to bring about a conviction. Thus, the
court could lower the fine imposed on four of the defendants and abstain from addressing
the political and constitutional claims of their attorneys.70 In the Kardosh case, all the
justices except Agranat chose to address the issue as having to do with corporation and
administrative law: the extent of the authority and discretion of the Registrar of Companies.
In the case of El Ard, Ltd.,71 the attorney representing the claimant, Yaakov Yeredor,
claimed that the reason behind the refusal to grant the company a permit to publish a
newspaper was political discrimination, which represented severe injury to the freedom of
the press and of the speech. But here again, the court framed the question as coming from
the field of administrative law: the extent of the authority of the District Supervisor and the
question whether he needed to provide reasons for his refusal to grant the permit.72 The court
refused to intervene in the decision not to grant the movement a permit to publish a
newspaper, and stated that it was not qualified to address the broader questions raised by the
claimant regarding the injury to the freedom of expression. These questions must be
addressed to the legislators, who are the only ones in a position to change the Mandatory
Defense Regulations.
Why did El Ard fail to publish its paper while Maki succeeded in publishing theirs, even
when the authorities attempted to prevent them from doing so? The El Ard, Ltd.73 case is
different from Kol Ha’am74 in that the discussion did not extend to newspapers that had been
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published legally and the dissemination of which had been suspended (based on Section 19
of the Press Ordinance),75 but was limited to newspapers for the publication of which no
license had been issued, as required under regulation number 94 of the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations of 1945.76 The presence of two separate legal frameworks allowed the court to
establish a relatively broad freedom of expression for Jewish political movements whose
papers, most of the time, already had licenses to publish or had no difficulty obtaining them.
The legal questions regarding these papers focused on whether censorship and sanctions can
be exercised in their case to restrict their freedom of expression after the fact. By contrast,
the freedom of expression of Arab political movements, who required to obtain licenses,
could be restricted, and the legal question in their case was whether it was possible to
intervene in the administrative decision to deny them such a license.77
The separation between the two frameworks was not entirely dichotomous. Maki’s Arabic
publication Al-Ittihad, fell into the first legal category, intended apparently for Jewish
publications, as it served a binational party, but its publication continued unencumbered
even after it became Rakah’s newspaper. The same attorney, Hanna Nakara, represented
both Al-Ittihad in the Kol Ha’am case78 and El Ard in the Kardosh case, in which El Ard
asked to incorporate for the purpose of publishing its newspaper, but was unable to reach
similar results in both cases. The different legal frameworks allowed the court to reach
different decisions without being accused of discriminating against Arab expression.
Moreover, the regional and international context within which the freedom of expression of
the two movements was discussed, 1953 in the first case, 1959-64 in the second, was vastly
different. Between the two dates dramatic changes have taken place: in the Soviet Union,
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Stalin’s death; in Egypt, the revolution and the rise of Nasser; in Israel, the ousting of BenGurion and his retirement, the Sinai war, and more. The publication of Kol Ha’am and AlIttihad created problems in Israel’s relations with a great power; El Ard’s publications
created problems in the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict. But it is not clear that the
authorities perceived the threat to the security of the state caused by the publication of Kol
Ha’am to be less than that caused by the El Ard publications.
It appears that between the middle of the first and second decades of the state, there was a
change in the way the Supreme Court balanced freedom of expression with the security
threat to the state, giving state security greater consideration, but without explicitly
changing the balancing formula that it created with the Kol Ha’am case.79 It was easy for the
court to effect this change because in the El Ard, Ltd. decision80 it was asked to examine the
actions of the District Supervisor on the basis of regulation 94 of the Defense Regulations.
The different legal framework allowed the court not to mention at all the Kol Ha’am
decision81 and the centrality of freedom of expression and of the “test of close certainty,”
which were at the center of Justice Agranat’s ruling in the Kol Ha’am case.82 El Ard was not
able to force the court to discuss the content of its publications and the question of whether
they represented a threat of any kind to the security of the state. The movement succeeded in
raising the question of freedom of expression for the Arab minority in Israel and the injury
to it, though not in affecting in the Supreme Court’s decision,

9.2

Freedom of Association (Kardosh)

The Kardosh case raised the question of the freedom of associating into a corporation. In
April 1960, several El Ard members submitted to the Registrar of Companies the forms
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required to register a company named “El Ard Company, Ltd.” In the charter submitted to
the registrar, the objectives of the company were described to include, among others,
“dealing with all matters of print, publication, translation of press reports, importation of
books and other printed matter of all types.” Based on a description of the facts included in
the decision, the registrar, after examining the Department of Justice and police files, and
after obtaining the opinion of the Attorney General, refused to register the company, relying
on Section 14 of the Companies Ordinance that allowed him to refuse registering a company
“according to his absolute discretion.”
Justice Agranat accepted the Attorney General’s opinion that the court should intervene in
the broad discretion granted to the Registrar of Companies only in extreme and rare
circumstances, but decided that this was one such case because the refusal to register the
company was not reached for the ends to which the discretion was granted. The registrar did
not have the authority to censure or supervise the press; this activity was regulated by the
Press Ordinance,83 which granted the authority to issue licenses for the publication of a
newspaper to the District Supervisor, and by the Defense Regulations, which granted the
authority to prohibit the publication of certain materials to the censor. Agranat repeated
what he had said in the Kol Ha’am case84 about the high social value associated with
freedom of expression, which can be curtailed only by those whom the legislation has
explicitly empowered to do so. The Registrar of Companies was not authorized by law to
restrict the freedom of expression and to protect the security of the state. Therefore, in this
case, the registrar acted for a flawed reason and his refusal to register the company was
void. In a short ruling, Justice Vitkon joined Agranat and stated that Section 14 authorized
the registrar to apply considerations within the realm of company law. He added that
employees of other state agencies “can no doubt prevent the publication of incitement and
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destructive propaganda, and they are more knowledgeable and efficient in their work than
the respondent [the registrar] can be.” Nevertheless, Justice Vitkon opened a breech for the
application of security considerations by reference to Section 4 of the ordinance, which
states that companies must be established for legal purposes only. Justice Cohn, however,
stated that the discretion granted by the legislators to the registrar is absolute and there is no
basis in law for court intervention in its application. The court should therefore not exceed
the limits set by legislation and not specify situations in which the registrar’s decisions are
voided. In sum, with a dissent opinion, the court ordered the registrar to register El Ard
Company, Ltd.
Gideon Hausner, the Attorney General, asked the Supreme Court for a further consideration
of this decision. In this discussion, in which Hausner himself represented the Registrar of
Companies, Justice Sussman added his vote to the majority and Chief Justice Olshan to
Justice Cohn’s minority opinion. Thus, the decision to order the Registrar of Companies to
register the El Ard Company stood with a three-to-two majority.
The two decisions, Kardosh v. The Registrar of Companies and Further Discussion The
Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh, given in 1961 and 1962, are often treated independently
of the sequence of decisions relating to El Ard. Legal scholars regard the Kardosh decision
as a declaration of the principle of freedom of association in Israel. Regarding the Kardosh
decision and quoting from it, Smadar Ottolenghi writes that “case law has already
recognized that the freedom to associate is one of the basic freedoms in Israeli law. This has
been stated clearly with regard to association as a company: this is a right, which is one of
the human freedoms.”85 Amnon Rubinstein views Kardosh as the first and central decision
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in the development of the freedom of association.86 Irit Haviv-Segal adds: “The Supreme
Court anchored in this decision the right of individuals to freely associate in a commercial
company... The decision of the Supreme Court in the Kardosh case represents a landmark in
this institution’s willingness to come to defend the individual from the authorities.”87
None of these discussions mention the fact that in November 1964 El Ard Company, Ltd.
was declared an illegal association by the Minister of Defense.88 Nor is it mentioned that
shortly afterward, the Haifa District Court granted the request of the Attorney General to
forfeit the company’s assets and dissolve the company. 89 Only by viewing the Kardosh
ruling in isolation from other decisions of the Supreme Court and from government actions
regarding the El Ard movement, can Kardosh be considered a pinnacle and important
landmark in the Supreme Court’s readiness to develop rights and freedoms and to protect
citizens from the authorities.
Documents in the State Archive demonstrate that while it decided the fate of the El Ard
Company, Kardosh did not affect significantly the status of freedom of association in Israel.
A file named “Registration of companies in areas under military rule,” reveals a hidden
world that is not mentioned in the Companies Ordinance or in the Kardosh decisions. In a
letter to Attorney General Gideon Hausner, the Registrar of Companies, A. Danziger, writes
on July 20, 1962:
More than ten years ago, the Attorney General issued an order requiring that I furnish to
the Attorney General information about every company whose founders reside on the
territories of the military administration, so that it can advise, following consultation
86
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with the military administration, whether there are reasons that justify use of the
discretion granted by Section 14 of the Companies Ordinance to the Justice Minister,
and delegated to the Registrar of Companies, to refuse registering the company.”

90

It turns out that as of the beginning of the 1950s, requests for an association in which one or
more of the founders lived in the territories of the military administration were approved by
the registrar only after he obtained, as instructed by the Attorney General, the approval of
the Ministry of Justice, which in turn obtained the approval of the military administration,
which quite likely obtained the approval of the General Security Services.
The letter makes reference not only to a decade-old practice, but also to the recent Kardosh
decision:
Given that the High Court of Justice stated that security considerations cannot serve as
guidelines in using my discretion according to Section 14 of the Companies Ordinance, I
see no reason to continue furnishing information about companies... and to delay for
some time the registration of the companies... In my opinion, I would be defying the
High Court of Justice if I were to continue furnishing the information... Please confirm
that there is no need for me to continue furnishing this information.”

Apparently, the High Court of Justice decision was clear and so should be the Attorney
General’s answer. The Kardosh Further Discussion denied the Minister of Justice and all
those under him the authority, which they believed they had, to prevent the formation of a
company for reasons of state security. But this was not how matters were perceived in the
Ministry of Justice. In a detailed opinion written for the Attorney General, Zvi Tarlo (who as
Deputy Attorney General represented the Registrar of Companies before the Supreme Court
in two rounds of the Kardosh case) and Michel Chasin of the State Prosecutor’s office
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(currently a Supreme Court Justice), reached an opposite conclusion. According to their
analysis, justice Agranat was alone in his opinion on the central issue under discussion here,
and the four other justices did not accept his opinion. According to the opinion of Tarlo and
Chasin, none of the four other justices stated that the Registrar of Companies was prohibited
from using security considerations. Based on an analysis of the arguments of each of the
four justices and the sum of these arguments, the state prosecutors reached the following
conclusion:
If people forming an association ask to register a company in order to pursue an
objective that is against the laws of the state, the Registrar of Companies is entitled not
to register it even if its stated objectives are legal as long as there is a substantiated basis
for a suspicion that the company is being organized for an illegal purpose. Therefore, the
Registrar of Companies is entitled, according to this approach, to refuse to register a
company if he has sufficient reason to suspect such a purpose based on the security
information before him.
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In the authors’ interpretation of the Supreme Court opinion, the registrar’s mistake was to
base his refusal on Section 14 of the ordinance. In their opinion, justices Sussman and
Vitkon based their conclusions on Section 4, as taken together with Section 14; Olshan
based his conclusion on both Sections 4 and 14; Cohn on Section 14, and by joining the
opinion of the Chief Justice, on Section 4 as well. Cohn, who in his previous function of
Attorney General had instructed the Registrar of Companies to submit applications for
security evaluation, continued in his new function to justify his earlier directive and to
maintain that the registrar was entitled to refuse to register companies based on Section 14
alone. The bottom line of the opinion is that even after the Kardosh Further Discussion
there was no need to change the existing arrangement whereby applications for association
of Arabs living under military rule were submitted for the evaluation of the security
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agencies, and whereby the Registrar of Companies was authorized to refuse to register
companies if “there is a reasonable basis to suspect that behind the objectives listed in the
articles of organization an illegal objective is being concealed.” Four additional months
passed before the Ministry of Justice decided to adopt the opinion, and in the end the
ministry issued an unequivocal directive to the Registrar of Companies to continue the
existing procedure.92
In subsequent years, the registrar continued the procedure, as evidenced by the many letters
in the file, in which he furnished the information about requests for incorporation to the
ministry, which then passed it on to the military administration before the association was
registered. Occasionally, the officer of the military administration responsible for the matter
noted that there was negative security information on one of the members of an association,
asked for additional information about the company being organized, its partners, purposes,
and intended business, or suggested reducing its objectives or delaying its registration. The
registrar continued to fight a rearguard action against the Attorney General’s directive. He
used various opportunities to express his opinion that at least a portion of the requests for
incorporation, for example those in which some of the members were Jews, and those whose
objectives appeared to be legal, should not be delayed until the security evaluation was
received. The Ministry of Justice repeatedly clarified its point to the registrar that the
procedure in place before the Kardosh Further Discussion should not be changed in any
way. Both the registrar and the heads of the Justice Ministry continued to voice their
opposing views, and the ministry again ordered the registrar to submit every single
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application for security evaluation and under no circumstances to rely in his decision on the
incorporation documents alone.93
In the end, in 1966, the registrar won under somewhat ironic circumstances. It turned out
that the abolishers of the military administration forgot to abolish the procedure requiring
the registrar to submit requests for incorporation to their approval. But Danziger didn’t
forget. Two weeks before the final abolition of the military administration, he wrote to the
Director General of the Ministry of Justice that he learned from the press and the radio about
the impending abolition of the military administration and asked whether he should continue
observing the directive of the Attorney General. The Director General sent the request to the
military administration, which replied: “We are not interested in reviewing applications for
incorporation.”94 This is how the fifteen-year-old procedure of security supervision over
Arab incorporation came to an end. It was not the Supreme Court, in a learned decision
handed down in a Further Discussion by five justices that stopped this procedure, but Moshe
Tadmor, acting staff officer at the military administration headquarters, who accomplished it
in a letter containing one short paragraph. Looking at it from a somewhat different angle, it
was not the judiciary nor the legislative branch that stopped the practice, but the executive,
in its decision to dismantle the mechanism of the military administration.
Approximately two years after the right of members of El Ard to form an organization was
established, they asked to incorporate an association named “The El Ard Movement.”
According to the Ottoman Associations Law, there is no need to obtain a permit for the
association. The only requirement is to send a notice about the association after the fact to
the District Supervisor. After receiving the notice, the supervisor sent a letter informing the
members of El Ard that “it is prohibited to establish an entity that pretends to call itself ‘The
93
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El Ard Movement,’” and “if it happens that despite the above you operate as a body, legal
action may be taken against you.” The District Supervisor based his opinion on Section 3 of
the Ottoman Associations Law, which stated: “It is prohibited to form associations against
the law and the general morals, and ones that the basis for which is illegal, or that are
harmful to the peace and integrity of the state, or against the state with the intention of
changing its current system of government or to divide ethnic groups for political purposes.”
There was criticism against the use of Section 3. It has been claimed that this section was an
anachronistic vestige of the Ottoman era, when the imperial authorities were wary about
separatist groups and conflicts that may flare up between various ethnic and religious
groups. It has also been claimed that Section 3 could be applied to almost any political
movement in Israel, and that the Mapai government could use it against any Jewish political
organization in opposition. Critics maintained that the Supervisor should have used Section
4 of the law, which prohibits political organizations founded on the basis of nationality and
race. But use of this section would also have been problematic, because many of the
political organizations in Israel were avowedly Jewish, and some excluded Arabs. A sharper
criticism maintained that neither section should have been used: “It appears that the Haifa
District Supervisor envied his colleague, the Registrar of Companies, and decided to do
something that would make the El Ard people the standard bearers in the struggle for the
freedom of democratic association in Israel.”95
Sabri Jirys, one of the directors of the association, appealed to the High Court of Justice
against the District Supervisor’s decision. The three justices who heard the case, Vitkon,
Landau, and Berinson, agreed to reject the appeal and uphold the prohibition against the
incorporation of the El Ard movement. The difference between the decision regarding
incorporation as a company in the Kardosh case, and incorporation as an association in the
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Jirys case, stemmed from a legal approach of unclear origin whereby Ltd. companies, as
business organizations, warrant lesser state intervention in their affairs than associations of a
more political and social nature. But it also stemmed from the fact that the association asked
to participate in a broader range of activities, including political activity, and not merely the
publication of a newspaper. Already at that time there was talk about the movement asking
to take part a year later in the Knesset elections, and it is possible that the court was
influenced in its decision by this possibility as well. Moreover, the association’s objectives
were described in its charter more clearly and explicitly than in the articles of organization
of the El Ard company, which made it easier for the court to justify its decision to uphold
the prohibition of the association.
It appears that the announcement by El Ard about its association and the itemized list of its
objectives were intended to test the government and the court. El Ard members could have
continued to operate within the framework of the existing company or on an unincorporated
basis. And it was not necessary to form an association to participate in the elections, since
lists of individual candidates and not incorporated parties ran for the Knesset. Finally, they
could have formulated a charter containing only three or four of the six points that were
included. The points dealing with “raising the educational, scientific, health, economic, and
political level of its members,” with the “establishment of full equality and social justice
among all segments of the population of Israel;” with “action to achieve peace in the Middle
East in particular and in the world in general;” and even with “support for all progressive
movements worldwide that oppose imperialism, and support for all peoples that attempt to
free themselves from it” would most likely not have angered the authorities and the High
Court of Justice. These objectives would have permitted the association a wide range of
activities in the political arena as well.
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However, members of the movement also wanted to include objectives C and D, which
discuss the mode of solution of the Palestinian problem and supported a certain movement
in the Arab world. These objectives were at the center of the discussion in the High Court of
Justice and eventually caused the prohibition of the association. The El Ard people were
interested in including these objectives, although in a somewhat hazy formulation, to test the
authorities. They did not place their hopes in the District Supervisor, given his past record.
The more meaningful test was that of the Supreme Court. Following the Further Discussion
of Kardosh, the court looked like the right arena. If they cannot secure the support of the
High Court of Justice, they can at least embarrass it and expose its Zionist leanings.
Contributing to the change in the court’s ruling were the development of El Ard and the
expansion of its objectives on one hand, and the growing Nasserite threat on the other. The
change is manifest in the court’s shift from a formal or even formalistic discussion in the
Kardosh case to a discussion of values in the Jirys case. It is a mistake to maintain, as some
jurists do, that the Kardosh decision takes a broader view of the right of association and of
the freedom of expression than the Jirys decision.
The Kardosh case deals with the authority of the Registrar of Companies and with the
interpretation of Section 14 of the ordinance. In the Kardosh case, the rights are in the
margins. In the first round, only Agranat attaches importance to the freedom of expression
and association on his way to a decision. Here the court is giving the authorities a lesson on
dealing with El Ard: rather than prohibiting its incorporation, they must deny it a license to
publish a newspaper based on their authority under the Press Ordinance, and censor its
publications based on their authority under the Defense Regulations. If the authorities still
want to prevent its incorporation, they ought to use Section 4 of the ordinance and not
Section 14. But the court does not undertake a substantive discussion of the objectives of El
Ard.
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In the Jirys case, however, the objectives of El Ard are at the center of the discussion,
together with the politics of the Jewish-Arab conflict, partly because the movement pushed
the court in that direction, and partly because the justices feel a strong need to bring the
issue into view. Justices Vitkon and Landau are not content in the Jirys case with a literal
commentary on the two problematic sections in the El Ard objectives; they interpret these
sections in light of the broader context of the Jewish-Arab conflict. Says Landau:
The court is entitled to use its information about what is happening in the world,
especially in this part of the world, as matters of public knowledge that do not require
evidence. The concepts “the liberation movement, union and socialism in the Arab
world,” and their joining together, have a clear and well-defined meaning in the
contemporary political lexicon.
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The court interprets this expression, present in the charter, based on the justices’ personal
understanding of the reality they experience as Jews living in Israel in the year 1964. In
addition, the justices are using press reprints and radio broadcasts from the Arab world,
supplied to them by the Attorney General to reveal the true objectives, in their view, of the
El Ard movement. But the justices reject the Attorney General’s offer to peruse classified
material regarding the El Ard movement and its founders:
In order not to deprive the claimant of his rights, we decided at the time not to accept
this material as long as we were not convinced based on the material open for all to see
that the claimant was in the right, so in any case we do not need it now, after we see
clearly from the unclassified material that the claim is to be rejected.
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The court chose not to inspect the classified material in order to create the impression of
equality between the parties contending before it. It was the Jirys and not the Yeredor
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decision that signaled the shift in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward El Ard. In the
Yeredor case, the justices merely continued that line, relying heavily on the Jirys discussion
of the objectives of the movement.

9.3

The Right to Be Elected (Yeredor)

In 1959, shortly after the formation of the El Ard movement, elections were held for the
fourth Knesset. El Ard’s position, as reflected in the first issue of its publication, in October
of the same year, was against participation, and the sheet called on the Arab minority in
Israel to boycott the elections. This caused great concern among the leaders of Maki. El Ard
did not take part in the elections to the fifth Knesset, in 1961, but there is no evidence
whether or not it called for a boycott. On September 3, 1965, Yaakov Yeredor,
representative of the El Ard movement, presented to the Elections Commission to the Sixth
Knesset a list of ten candidates that chose the name “The Socialists List.” First on the list
were Salih Baransi, Habib Qa’uqji, and Sabri Jirys, and the last one was Mansur Kardosh –
all of them known figures from earlier legal confrontations of El Ard. Two of the candidates
were lawyers, two were teachers, and two were workers. Three of the candidates lived in
Nazareth, two in Taybeh, and two in Haifa. This was a country-wide list representing
various classes associated with El Ard. Six of the candidates were among the founders of the
El Ard, Ltd. company, incorporated according to law following the decision of the High
Court of Justice, and which was subsequently declared by the Defense Minister as an illegal
association. Five of the candidates were among the originators of the El Ard association, the
establishment of which was prohibited by the Haifa District Supervisor. With the list of
candidates were submitted seven booklets containing 750 signatures, as required by the
Election Law.98
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Two contradictory explanations can be adduced for El Ard’s change of approach with regard
to the elections. One maintains that the decision to run followed from the movement’s
acceptance of the basic rules of Israeli democracy and a desire to have a say in it, and
perhaps also a recognition of Israel’s legitimacy. The other maintains that it was the result
of an absence of alternatives and not of choice, as the authorities and the courts have closed
all other activities before the movement. Yet another explanation claims that the leaders of
the movement wanted to take advantage of the election to obtain the immunity granted to
members of Knesset from limitations imposed on their activities and from indictment for
these activities. This last explanation is somewhat puzzling, as it does not address the
question of why didn’t the leaders of the movement attempt to take advantage of the
immunity in two previous elections, since from the beginning they were aware of the fact
that the military administration and the security services would not allow them to operate
freely. Furthermore, this explanation does not address the question of whether the El Ard
leaders indeed believed in their chances of electing even one member to the Knesset. The
decision to run for election involved certain risks, for the individuals and the movement
alike. It is therefore possible that the leaders changed their position about parliamentary
activity or were interested in yet another legal battle as part of their struggle by judicial
means.
In any case, the movement’s decision to run presented a serious challenge first to the Central
Elections Commission and subsequently to the Supreme Court. The Knesset Elections
Law,99 as well as the Basic Law: The Knesset,100 have defined certain technical requirements
for a list of candidates, but no conditions or restrictions regarding their objectives or
platforms. When it became clear that there was opposition on the part of representatives of
various parties in the Elections Commission to the acceptance of El Ard, the first question
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that arose was whether the commission had the authority to discuss the matter and rule on it.
To understand the legal context within which the commission operated, a review of the
legislative history of the right to vote and to be elected is in order. The question of who has
the right to vote and to be elected was raised immediately after the establishment of the
state. The first section of the first law passed in the State of Israel, on May 19, 1948, the
Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance,101 states: “The representatives of Arab citizens of the
state who recognize the State of Israel will be included in the Provisional State Council...”
This section indicates that the recognition of the State of Israel is a condition for Arabs to
ear the right to be represented in the state’s legislative council, and perhaps a condition that
the representatives themselves must meet. In practice, no Arab representatives were included
in the state council at that time, and the subject became relevant only on the eve of elections
to the Constituent Assembly in 1949.
In the meantime, in September 1948, following the Altalena incident, the question arose of
restricting the political activities of Jewish parties, especially of the Herut movement. In a
memorandum of September 8, 1948 entitled “The government’s options of dealing with
political parties whose activities are suspected of being illegal,” several possible actions
were being evaluated by the Ministry of Justice. The recommendation was that the Ottoman
Association Law, in conjunction with the Criminal Code Ordinance, provided adequate
means. The author of the memorandum, Dr. W. Schofef, did not address explicitly the
possibility of using regulations 84 and 88 of the Mandatory Defense (Emergency)
Regulations102 “considering the fact that these regulations are about to be abolished.”103 The
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assassination of UN envoy Count Bernadotte, about two weeks later, triggered the passing of
the Prevention of Terror Ordinance104 and its use against the Lehi movement.
Although the issue of the legitimacy of Jewish and Arab political movements arose soon
after the establishment of the state, no substantive restrictions to the right to vote and to be
elected were specified in the Elections Ordinance for the Constituent Assembly105 (which
became the first Knesset). Neither have such restriction been specified in subsequent
elections laws. Even when the Knesset passed permanent legislation in this area (Basic Law:
Knesset,106 in 1958 and the Knesset Elections Law,107 in 1959), the situation remained
unchanged: the legislation addressed technical and procedural details but placed no
restrictions on the lists of candidates based on their objectives. After elections to the fifth
Knesset, in 1961, the Chairman of the Elections Commission, Zvi Berinson, sent a
memorandum to the Prime Minister in which he pointed out several deficiencies and
omissions in the law and proposed the creation of a committee to recommend remedies.
Discussion of the Berinson recommendations in the Ministry of Justice continued through
most of the term of the fifth Knesset. And although the El Ard movement already existing
during this period, the possibility of placing restrictions on what constituted a submittable
list of candidates, or on the authority of the Elections Commission to disqualify a list was
not raised during the discussions.108 It is possible that the hidden assumption was that El Ard
and similar movements will not reach the stage of submitting lists of candidates to Knesset
elections because the authorities will be able to stop them during their formative stage
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through the Ottoman Association Law, the Mandatory Defense Regulations,109 and the
Israeli Prevention of Terror Ordinance.110
The lack of provisions within the law for the disqualification of lists of candidates did not
deter the members of the Elections Commission to the sixth Knesset.
The line-up of forces regarding El Ard was unlike that regarding military rule. Most of the
parties united against Mapai in their opposition to military rule. In the disqualification of El
Ard, Mapai was joined by the other Zionist parties. Representatives of Maki and Rakah in
the commission opposed the disqualification of El Ard, although Rakah people claimed that
Maki’s opposition to the disqualification was only lip service. Others claimed that Rakah
also hoped to see El Ard disqualified to boost its own chances in the elections.
As has been shown above, the differences between the platforms of Rakah and El Ard have
led to competition between the two parties for the affections of Arab intellectuals, for the
support of Arab states, and for the votes of Arab voters. Incidentally, Rakah did not appear
to fear that the disqualification of El Ard will lead to its own disqualification later. For
several reasons, the authorities treated Rakah with less hostility. Injury to the party could
have negative repercussions for Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union. The party even
served as a conduit between the governments of Israel and of the Soviet Union in Middle
Eastern affairs and on matters relating to Soviet Jewry. Rakah was a faction of a movement
that had run in every election and it would have been difficult to justify its sudden
disqualification. Meir Wilner, one of its leaders, was among the signatories of the
Declaration of Independence and a member of Knesset since.
The chairman of the Central Elections Commission, justice Landau, played a key role in the
commission’s decision to disqualify El Ard.111 It appears that Landau not only chaired the
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discussions of party representatives, but also led and structured them. He reached the
conclusion that the commission was authorized to disqualify a list, offered criteria for
disqualification, and maintained that El Ard met those criteria. He said, among others:
We are not meeting here as a court of law, and therefore do not demand proof as a court
would, based on the rules of evidence. We can be content with less... And the Supreme
Court, in my opinion, will uphold the position of this commission... Our function is to
designate the border... And in my opinion it is possible and necessary to designate this
border.

Landau also creates the legal pattern which, in his opinion, grants the commission the
authority to disqualify a list of candidates by a combined interpretation of the Basic Law:
The Knesset,112 the Knesset Elections Law,113 and the Ottoman Association Law. Landau
summarizes the case thus:
Organizations that deny the existence of the state should not join the Knesset, the
sovereign body in the country... These are basic concepts of our constitutional regime,
which we are entitled to include among the sections of the Knesset Elections Law.

Landau made frequent references to the Jirys decision during his presentations before the
commission; he was the senior justice on that case. He has known the El Ard members for at
least five years since he wrote the decision in the Qa’uqji case,114 toward the end of 1960.
Landau did not hesitate to express his opinion regarding the manner in which the Supreme
Court is expected to react to the commission’s decision. There is no doubt that the authority
with which he presented his factual position and his legal conclusions influenced the
111
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commission’s decision. He also influenced the Attorney General who adopted Landau’s
position and reasoning in his arguments before the Supreme Court in the Yeredor case. It is
likely that Landau’s opinion has helped form the positions of his colleagues in the Supreme
Court. Landau’s central role in the El Ard affair has not been properly assessed.115
El Ard’s decision to run in the elections to the sixth Knesset presented the toughest
challenge yet to the Supreme Court. The primary reason for this is that no restrictions have
been legislated on the right to be elected. Second, the High Court of Justice has not been
asked before to decide on the matter, and it had to do so for the first time seventeen years
after the establishment of the state, without any case law to rely on. Third, because justice
Landau put the weight of all his prestige behind the decision of the Central Elections
Commission. Forth, because owing to the closeness of the elections the court had only four
days, including the Sabbath and a holiday, to decide. Fifth, because much was at stake: on
one hand, a basic constitutional right, and on the other, the fear that if the restriction is not
put in place at that time, it will not be possible to do so after the candidates are elected to the
Knesset and acquire immunity.
The court ruled and established the important precedent that the right to be elected in Israel
is restricted and can be denied to a list of candidates whose objective is to place on the
agenda the question of the destruction of the state and the denial of its sovereignty. But the
court could not have reached this decision through a formalistic line of argumentation based
on the explicit language of the law or of legal precedents; it needed interpretive acrobatics,
which exposed its ideological leanings. The majority justices, Agranat and Sussman,
overcame the absence of basis for the disqualification of a list of candidates in the Knesset
Elections Law by basing it on other sources: the historical narrative of Judaism and Zionism,
the holocaust, the Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln’s correspondence, the
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lessons of the Weimar Republic, and the literature on statehood theory. Agranat’s solution
was especially interpretive: the laws of the state, in particular its constitutional laws, must
be interpreted in light of the “constitutional given... that the State of Israel is lasting and that
its continuing existence and eternity are not in question.” For Sussman, the solution lay in
the recognition of supreme principles found in positive law and even above the constitution,
which can be called “natural law.” They both went beyond Landau’s position, who proposed
a standard interpretation of the election laws116 in combination with the association law.
Haim Cohn, in his minority view, interpreted the Knesset Election Law literally117 and found
no authorization for the Elections Commission or the Supreme Court to disqualify a list of
candidates based on its objectives.
In the absence of such authorization on the part of the legislator, there is no justification
for unilaterally making laws and denying one’s right: not in logic, necessity, the love of
homeland, and no other consideration, whatever it may be.

In the absence of legal authorization, there is no possibility of discussing El Ard’s objectives
and the measure of threat it represents to the existence of the state. Cohn maintains that the
disqualification should be voided and adds a recommendation to the legislators to define by
law the authority to disqualify a list of candidates, similarly to the manner of the German
constitution after the second world war.
Most of the above discussion of El Ard’s objectives is not an analysis based on an attempt to
understand in retrospect what contemporaries were not able to grasp. It is based primarily on
freely available sources, that are not classified or locked up in archives, and on studies based
on open sources. These sources include court decisions, statements made by politicians,
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material from Israeli newspapers, including those of Maki, Rakah, and El Ard.118 This means
that the picture presented above, if the mosaic has been assembled correctly, is similar to
that received by the Israeli public, the Attorney General, and the justices of the Supreme
Court during the period under investigation. The question as to whether the disqualification
of El Ard was proper must be viewed in this light. The discussion of El Ard’s objectives
complicates the question of the movement’s disqualification. El Ard’s objectives make it
difficult to find an easy answer. The movement did not use violence and did not call for it. It
did not call for the abolition of basic democratic rule in Israel, and showed no signs that if it
were to come to power in Israel it intended to cancel democracy, which already shows that
the analogy with Weimar is problematic. It is not clear that El Ard supported the continued
existence of Israel or recognized its right to exist. But it is difficult to maintain that the
movement, in 1965, posed a threat to the existence of the state with any degree of certainty.
Were it to join with external Arab forces at time of war, would it make the military threat
faced by Israel more severe? It is difficult to believe that in such a case a few El Ard
members of Knesset would count for much compared with Nasser’s call to arms on one
hand, and compared with suppression by Israeli security forces on the other.
Therefore, Ruth Gavison reasonably claims that what was at stake in the Yeredor case, and
perhaps already in the Jirys case, was not the security aspect, the clear and present danger to
the state. What was at stake was the fundamental incompatibility of El Ard’s objectives with
the basic values of the state. The question was: What is the threshold beyond which a
118
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movement cannot participate in the state’s political process because the gap between its
values and those of the state is too great? The majority answer of the justices was that the
gap between the values of El Ard and those of the state was too wide, which denied them the
right to participate in the political dialog of the election campaign and the Knesset. But the
court didn’t specify where exactly the borderline was. Are to be disqualified only
movements that propose the establishment on the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine of
an Arab Palestinian state, which is part of the Arab nation? Is it possible to disqualify any
movement that proposes a change in the country’s 1949 borders, for example by
implementing the UN Partition Plan of 1947? Does a call for the return of all the refugees
create a gap that justifies disqualification? Is the issue of the means others intend to use to
implement objectives they share with the movement relevant; for example, in a situation in
which the movement does not call for the use of violence by its members but supports (or
does not condemn) such use by others who share its objectives? Is cooperation with entities
outside Israel for the furtherance of the objective enough to disqualify the movement? These
and other questions remained unanswered by the Yeredor decision.
The interpretive move used in the Yeredor ruling points toward two important phenomena in
the shaping of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the second decade of the state. The
court did not see itself closely bound by the language of legislation as it did in the first
decade, but, when it saw fit, interpreted the parliamentary acts more freely to meet its
objectives. Consequently, the court placed itself in a position that would enable it to
intervene and define the extent of discretion of the executive branch. It took away from the
Registrar of Companies the absolute discretion which it was granted by the legislators, but
granted substantive discretion to the Knesset Elections Commission despite the fact that the
law authorized the commission only to examine the technical compliance of the documents
which could serve as an important secondary source for the present study, has exceptionally been classified,
and its only copy is held at Shabak headquarters.

75

submitted by the lists of candidates. In the case of the restriction of the right to be elected,
the court went one step further in freeing itself from the letter of the law by recognizing the
principles of natural law and unwritten constitutional principles. The special characteristic
of these vague principles is that it is the court that defines their content, as they are not the
result of legislation, and that legislation is subject to them. Nevertheless, the court did not
subject laws passed by the Knesset to judicial review based on these principles, but
interpreted the laws with reference to these principles.
The court, however, did not review laws passed by the Knesset in light of these principles,
but interpreted them in this light. To disqualify the El Ard list, the court effected toward the
end of the second decade a dramatic shift in the legal theory by which it operated. The
question is whether this was a local, instrumental shift for the purpose of achieving a desired
ideological objective in the case at hand, or a basic shift that was part of a broader trend,
reflected in court decisions in a range of areas. Based on an examination of several
important rulings by justice Agranat in the mid 1960s, Pnina Lahav suggests the second
alternative.119

10 Afterword
Were El Ard not curbed, would it have altered the patterns of political activity and
voting among the Arab minority? It is possible that the restrictions imposed on El Ard
delayed the development of Arab political parties in Israel by a decade or two, but it is also
possible that the movement was ahead of its time. It is difficult to estimate the support the
movement would have enjoyed had it been allowed to organize, express itself, and freely
participate in the elections. It is also difficult to determine the role played by legal actions in
halting the activity of the movement, which faced difficulties within its own community and
not only on the part of the authorities. The effects of legal restrictions on parties and their
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supporters are difficult to measure in other countries as well and controversies over the
effectiveness of party banning are common.
El Ard didn’t go all the way in its attempts to expose the limits of Israeli democracy,
the areas of legitimate political activity for the Arab minority, and the meaning of the
Jewishness of the state, because it deliberately obscured its objectives and means. Thus, it is
not possible to determine with certainty, based on its publications and claims expressed in
court, whether or not it proposed the destruction of the Jewish state and the establishment of
an Arab state in its stead. It was also not clear what its position was on the question of the
means to be used to achieve its objectives: joining of entities outside Israel, use of violence,
civil protest and disobedience, or action within the elected bodies of the state. As a result,
some of the interesting issues that relate to the limits of political discourse in Israel were not
explored at that affair.120 The objectives of political parties and the intended means of
achieving them are often elusive. Court attempts to define them using legal evidence rules
often turn out to be more complicated then expected.
In the case of El Ard, as long as the regular legislative system, and especially the
emergency legislation, delivered the desired outcomes, the court could afford to argue its
decisions formalistically and hide behind the law. The shift that took place in the Supreme
Court in the mid 1960s can be partially explained by the fact that El Ard was able to touch
upon sensitive issues that forced the court to reveal its ideological leanings. Specifically, by
deciding not to settle for extra-parliamentary activity and to run in the elections it exposed
the court. The case of El Ard is unique in that in its case the right to be elected was deprived
by a decree that claimed to rely on authority grounded in basic constitutional and historical
principles that were not mentioned in any constitutional document, parliamentary
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legislation, or court precedent. The court was forced to use the Zionist narrative, the Weimer
legacy, natural law, and constitutional principles because the legislators didn’t equip it with
a provision that allowed the disqualification of a list of candidates. Even when written and
codified constitutions exist that provide a formal basis for the exclusion of candidates and
the banning of parties, the empowering clauses are often vague and open to a variety of
interpretations and applications. Discussion of the litigation over the banning of political
parties allows scholars to examine the fundamental values of any society, state, and supranational organization.
It is possible that the shift it the Court’s attitude toward El Ard resulted not from the
movement’s objects and actions but rather from a shift in the Court’s perception of the
nature of the threat, which was affected by the growing pan-Arab enthusiasm and the
inflammatory rhetoric calling for the destruction of Israel. The justices may not have
excelled in analyzing Israel’s strategic position: its military strength, its developing nuclear
capability, the reality of the threat to its water sources, and the danger in the terrorist
incursions. They had neither the information nor the expertise to do so. They may have been
able to form an opinion about the desired boundaries of political discourse, but not regarding
the probability of an actual threat from the part of El Ard to the existence of the State of
Israel. Real and perceived threats are the prime causes for the banning of political parties.
The question whether courts can tell one from the other, and should they be expected to do
so, must be central to any discussion of the role of the courts in restricting political activity.
It became clear in recent years that efforts to ban political parties are not taking
place only in non-democratic states and are not a matter of the past in many democracies.
Attempts to outlaw political groups that are alleged to approve the use of violence, attempts
to limit the expression of views that challenge the core values of democratic nation-states,
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and attempts to ban radical right, separatist, or religious political parties are more
widespread in recent years than at any other time since 1945. This trend has not yet peaked.
The present article attempts to shed light on some of the aspects of the interaction
between the El Ard movement and the Israeli Supreme Court. The article does not purport to
present a comprehensive normative discussion or recommend a desired set of rules in
matters of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to be elected. The case
presented here can contribute to discussions of this nature and of the broader issues of
legitimate political activity in a democracy and the right of the democracy to protect itself at
the constitutional level.
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